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Abstract
In this paper we analyze a stylized version of an environment with public goods, dynamic
linkages, and legislative bargaining. Our theoretical framework studies the provision of a durable
public good as a modiﬁed two-period version of Battaglini et al. (2012). The experimental design
allows us to disentangle ineﬃciencies that would result in a one-shot world (static ineﬃciencies)
from additional ineﬃciencies that emerge in an environment where decisions in the present
aﬀect future periods (dynamic ineﬃciencies). We solve the ﬁrst-best solution and compare it
to the symmetric stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium of a legislative bargaining game. The
experimental results indicate that subjects do react to dynamic linkages and, as such, there is
evidence of both static and dynamic ineﬃciencies. The quantitative predictions of the bargaining
model with respect to the share of dynamic ineﬃciencies are closest to the data when dynamic
linkages are high. To the extent that behavior is diﬀerent from what is predicted by the model,
a systematic pattern emerges, namely the use of strategic cooperation whereby groups increase
the eﬃciency of current proposals by selectively punishing, in future proposals, individuals who
propose highly ineﬃcient allocations.
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1 Introduction
Many important public goods are supplied by the government and thus are determined via a legisla-
tive process. Furthermore, most of these public goods are long lived and cannot be appropriately
considered in the context of a one-shot decision. Rather, over time, the legislature must repeatedly
determine how much resources to allocate to such public goods, and prior investments in the public
good have impacts beyond the moment where the investment is made. There have been recent
developments in economic theory integrating these factor in models of public good provision with
dynamic linkages. Indeed, papers in political economy such as Battaglini and Coate (2008) recog-
nize the importance of dynamic linkages and provide an analysis of these type of situations. Once
the setting is a dynamic one, there are multiple channels that generate ineﬃciencies, or diﬀerences
between the equilibrium level of public goods and the one a central planner would select. In par-
ticular, agents not only wish to free-ride with respect to other agents' contribution in the current
period, but also with respect to the contributions of agents in the future.
In this paper we design a stylized version of an environment with public goods, dynamic linkages,
and legislative bargaining. The goal is to simplify the environment while maintaining some of the
key features present in models such as Battaglini and Coate (2008). More precisely, our theoretical
framework studies the provision of a durable public good as a modiﬁed version of Battaglini et
al. (2012). We develop an experimental design that allows us to disentangle ineﬃciencies that
would result in a one-shot world (static ineﬃciencies) from extra ineﬃciencies that emerge in an
environment in which decisions in the present aﬀect the future (dynamic ineﬃciencies). Note that
such a question is particularly relevant given the frequent observation that free-ridding is much less
severe in public good experiments than the theory suggests. Hence, one may wonder if the more
subtle issue of dynamic free ridding is something people even take into consideration. The setting
put forth to investigate this question is simple. In each of two periods of time, a committee decides
on the allocation of a ﬁxed budget over a public good and private consumption for each member.
The division is determined by majority rule using the multilateral bargaining procedure of Baron
and Ferejohn (1989).1 The dynamic link is provided by the public good, as a portion δ ∈ (0, 1) of
the ﬁrst period investment survives and is available in period 2. In other words, the level of the
public good in period 2 equals the portion that survived from period 1 plus period 2 investment.
We solve for eﬃciency and also characterize the bargaining equilibrium, a symmetric stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium, which is the most common concept used in applied work.
In the bargaining equilibrium, investment is distorted away from the ﬁrst best. To see why,
consider ﬁrst the case in which no portion of the public good survives (δ = 0). When the planner
decides how to allocate the budget, she considers the beneﬁt that an additional unit of investment
has for all committee members. With bargaining being settled by majority rule, however, the
equilibrium results from computing the investment beneﬁts to aminimum winning coalition (MWC).
The consequence is underinvestment or static ineﬃciencies.
1One member chosen at random submits an allocation proposal that is then voted on by all committee members.
If the proposal does not achieve a simple majority of votes, it is rejected, and the process repeats itself.
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When the public good is durable (δ ∈ (0, 1)) there is an obvious incentive for higher investment
in period 1, but also new sources of underinvestment. A suboptimal period 1 choice will now aﬀect
future choices. In the bargaining equilibrium, the committee will start in period 2 with a lower
level of the public good, constraining the set of options for that period with respect to the eﬃcient
solution. The planner in a dynamic setting considers the eﬀect that current decisions have on all
committee members in the present and in the future. But, again, in the bargaining equilibrium,
period 1 decisions are only concerned with the present and the future of a subset of members,
namely, those in the MWC.
We will use the term dynamic ineﬃciencies to account for any underinvestment that results on
top of static ineﬃciencies, where static ineﬃciencies are the ones that emerge when public goods do
not aﬀect payoﬀs for more than a single period. In the bargaining equilibrium, dynamic ineﬃciencies
can represent a very large portion of total ineﬃciencies. For example, in our parametrization, if only
80% of period 1 investment survives in period 2, dynamic ineﬃciencies account for approximately
three-quarters of the total ineﬃciencies. Our theoretical environment provides a very conservative
measure of dynamic underinvestment. First, we use a two-period model as it is the simplest envi-
ronment in which dynamic eﬀects arise, but the ineﬃciency gap increases with the time horizon.
Second, in our experiments committees involve three members, but dynamic ineﬃciencies increase
with committee size. In other words, ﬁndings in line with dynamic ineﬃciency predictions in our
setting are suggestive of an even greater role for the practical relevance of dynamic eﬀects in general.
Our experimental design allows us to disentangle the static from the dynamic component. The
control treatment sets δ = 0 and will provide us with a measure of static underinvestment. We also
study in the laboratory the cases δ ∈ {0.2, 0.8}, so that we can compute dynamic underinvestment
in two treatments. Moreover, our treatments allow us to study the comparative statics of δ. As
the value of δ increases, dynamic ineﬃciencies as a share of total ineﬃciencies also increase in the
bargaining equilibrium prediction.
The key results with respect to public good investment in period one can be summarized as
follows. In our control treatment (δ = 0), mean and median public good investments are not
statistically diﬀerent from those predicted by theory.2 When comparing investment against the static
benchmark, our evidence suggests that there are two main diﬀerences stemming from a dynamic
environment. First, there is a sizable presence of period one proposals (up to 60%) that beneﬁt all
members equally, with investment levels close to eﬃciency. In other words, when the beneﬁts of
period one investment in the public good increase, the proportion of subjects submitting proposals
with MWCs decrease. Second, as δ increase, there is more heterogeneity in period 1 investment.3
A prominent ﬁnding in our dynamic treatments is the presence of strategic cooperation. Most
subjects who make proposals with period 1 investment close to eﬃciency propose a MWC in period
2, i.e. they are not unconditional altruists. On average, those subjects use the period 2 proposal to
2Other aspects of behavior are similar to what has been reported in legislative bargaining games without public
good (see for instance Fréchette et al. (2003)): a majority of proposals are approved immediately, 70% of proposals
involve MWCs, and there is evidence of proposal power but the advantage is well below the theoretical prediction.
3Also, in dynamic environments, there is no evidence of proposer power in private allocations.
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punish those period 1 proposers who did not select high investment, and reward those who did, by
strategically including them in period 2's MWC. Theoretically, this strategy is not subgame perfect.
In our data, given the choices of other participants, the payoﬀ diﬀerence with respect to those
proposing MWCs is not large. Therefore, it is not unreasonable that a large proportion of subjects
would select strategic cooperative proposals even after substantial experience with the environment.
Despite the heterogeneity in individual behavior, the bargaining equilibrium prediction on the
share of dynamic ineﬃciencies is quite accurate when dynamic linkages are high. The presence of
proposals with investment levels close to the planner's solution reduces the size of ineﬃciencies when
we aggregate the data. However, dynamic ineﬃciencies as a share of total ineﬃciencies are at 75%,
quite close to the theoretical prediction of 72%. In other words, when dynamic linkages are high,
ineﬃciencies introduced by the dynamic structure represent a sizable portion of total ineﬃciencies,
as predicted by the bargaining equilibrium. When dynamic linkages are relatively low, dynamic
ineﬃciencies become less prominent.
Our work is related to previous work on public good provision in static and dynamic settings.
With respect to the former, our baseline treatment provides a setup in which the main theoretical
prediction and the eﬃcient solution involve interior investment levels. These features contrast
with the usual framework used to study public goods, the linear public good game (or voluntary
contribution mechanism  VCM). In that model the dominant strategy and the eﬃcient outcome are
at the boundary of the action space, with an equilibrium prediction of no investment and an eﬃcient
outcome involving full provision. In such a setup, experiments show that investment in the public
good remains positive even when participants have experience (see Ledyard (1995) and Vesterlund
(2013)). Recent studies of public goods games modify the original VCM to have an interior solution
in dominant strategies (see for instance Menietti et al. (2014)). Our work adds to this literature by
also providing a static framework with interior solutions in which to study public good provision.
Despite the equilibrium of our game not being in dominant strategies, contributions to the public
good in the static treatment are much closer to equilibrium levels than in typical VCM experiments.
Similarly studies such as Menietti et al. (2014) report results close to equilibrium. The fact that
both ours and other studies ﬁnd congruent results in this regard highlight the importance of the
speciﬁc details of the game in earlier results.
Our paper also relates to the literature studying public good provision in committees. Two recent
papers investigate public good provision in static environments. Fréchette et al. (2012) implement in
the laboratory Volden and Wiseman (2006) model of static public good provision with multilateral
bargaining. The authors ﬁnd that public good provision is closely related to the relative weight that
subjects put on the private versus public goods, consistent with the predictions of Markov perfect
equilibrium. Christiansen et al. (2014) conduct an experimental study of Jackson and Moselle (2002)
model, in which players bargain over a single policy dimension and vary whether or not proposer
has an access to a budget (pork) that she can privately allocate among committee members. The
authors ﬁnd that the introduction of private goods increases total welfare and shifts the location of
the public policy issue from the median towards the one preferred by the most extreme member,
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who cares the most about the public policy issue.
There are several papers that study public good provision in dynamic settings. Contributions
in this area include Herr et al. (1997), Noussair and Matheny (2000), Lei and Noussair (2002),
Battaglini and Palfrey (2012), Battaglini et al. (2012, 2013, 2014a), Saijo et al. (2014) and Vespa
(2015).
Of these, the most closely related is Battaglini et al. (2012), which analyzes, both theoretically
and experimentally, an inﬁnite horizon model of the accumulation of a durable public good under
diﬀerent voting rules, using a diﬀerent multilateral bargaining mechanism from the one in the present
study. Its main theoretical result, which ﬁnds strong support in the experimental data, is that a
higher majority requirement for passing proposals leads to more eﬃcient public good investment.
Aggregate levels of public investment are close to the predictions of the solution concept most
commonly used in the literature (Markov perfect equilibrium) and behavior reﬂects non-myopic
decision making. The motivation for and main contribution of the present paper is diﬀerent: to
study a simple two-period environment where it is possible to disentangle the static from dynamic
forces behind underinvestment in a transparent way. This simple two-period framework preserves
main trade-oﬀs that are present in the dynamic setting with durable public goods and allows for
characterization of more complex history-dependent strategies that have a substantial eﬀect on
the intertemporal pattern of investment.4 While the two studies were designed with very diﬀerent
objectives in mind, there are some interesting similarities. Both studies ﬁnd that ineﬃciencies are
pervasive, with levels of public good investment signiﬁcantly below the optimal level. The types of
proposals observed are also comparable, with most proposals involving side payments to minimum
(or nearly minimum) winning coalitions.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the model that serves as our benchmark.
Sections 3, 4 and 5 give the experimental design and the results, respectively. A brief discussion of
our results is reported in Section 6.
2 Theoretical Framework
As mentioned in the introduction, the model is meant to simplify dynamic models of public good
provision while retaining the key strategic tensions of such an environment. The game is a two-period
model (t = 1, 2) of multilateral bargaining with n (odd) committee members indexed by i, each
representing one district. There is no discounting between periods. In period t the committee decides
on how to allocate a ﬁxed budget Bt between pork to each member denoted by xit, and investment
in a durable public good, It. Furthermore consumption and investment must be non-negative in
both periods, and there is no borrowing or lending. That is, xit ≥ 0, It ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
xit + It ≤ Bt,
t = 1, 2. Investment accumulates in time and the resulting stock represents the level of the public
good, gt.
4As shown in Section 5, considering history-dependent strategies is also useful for explaining the heterogeneity
observed in the experimental data.
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The utility of member i in period t is given by
Uit(xit, gt) = xit + u(gt),
where u(gt) represents utility from the public good investment. We assume u is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable and has standard properties: u′(gt) > 0, u′′(gt) < 0 for all gt > 0 and limgt→0 u′(gt) =
∞. The committee starts with zero stock of public good (g0 = 0) and in period 1 the level of the
public good is equal to that period's investment (g1 = I1). A portion δ ∈ [0, 1] of the ﬁrst period's
investment survives and is still available in period 2, so the depreciation rate is d = 1−δ. The stock
of the public good in period 2 is given by g2 = δg1 + I2 = δI1 + I2. If the public good does not fully
depreciate (δ > 0) between periods, the problem is dynamic.
In the remainder of this section we characterize and compare public good investments that arise
from the bargaining process with the eﬃcient levels implemented by the social planner. We present
here the main trade-oﬀs of the model and refer the reader to Appendix A for complete proofs.
Our discussion is focused on understanding the sources and the determinants of the ineﬃciencies in
public good provision due to the dynamic nature of bargaining process.
2.1 Eﬃcient Solution
The Planner chooses investment levels and private allocations for each member so as to maximize
welfare of the society (aggregate utility of agents) subject to budget constraint and the rule that
governs the accumulation of the stock of public good. Since agents' utilities depend linearly on the
private allocations, the planner's solution pins down the eﬃcient level of investment in each period
(IP
∗
1 , I
P ∗
2 ) but is silent regarding how the remaining funds are distributed between agents in private
shares.
max
({xij ,IPj }i=1,..,nj=1,2 )
[
n∑
i=1
xi1 + n · u (g1) +
n∑
i=1
xi2 + n · u (g2)
]
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi1 + I
P
1 ≤ B1 and
n∑
i=1
xi2 + I
P
2 ≤ B2
IP1 ≥ 0, IP2 ≥ 0, xij ≥ 0 ∀i, j
where g1 = I
P
1 and g2 = δg1 + I
P
2
The Planner's solution depends on whether and which constraints are binding. If no constraints
are binding, then there is an interior solution, (IP
∗
1 , I
P ∗
2 ), characterized by two ﬁrst-order conditions
that capture a familiar trade-oﬀ:
period 2: n · u′(δIP ∗1 + IP
∗
2 ) = 1 (1a)
period 1: n ·
[
u′(IP
∗
1 ) + δu
′(δIP
∗
1 + I
P ∗
2 )
]
= 1 (1b)
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The interior level of public good provision equates in each period the social marginal value of
an additional unit of investment and its social marginal cost, which equals 1 in both periods. The
marginal beneﬁt of an extra unit of public good in period 2 is simply n ·u′(δIP ∗1 +IP
∗
2 ), as it beneﬁts
equally all n members of the committee. In period 1, however, there is an additional term, which
represents the eﬀect of the public investment in period 1 that partially survives until period 2.5
If the solution is not interior, then which constraint is binding depends on parameters (B1, B2, δ).
When available budgets (B1, B2) are suﬃciently small the planner allocates all available funds to
public good provision. If this is not the case, then depending on the depreciation rate, the planner
might choose to allocate a portion of period 2's budget to public investment or distribute all available
budget in private shares. For suﬃciently high rates of public good survival δ it is eﬃcient not to
invest at all in the public good in period 2, while for low δ the eﬃcient solution has IP
∗
2 > 0. In
any case, our assumptions on u implies a unique planner solution (IP
∗
1 , I
P ∗
2 ).
2.2 Bargaining Solution
We model the bargaining process following the classical model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In
each period there is a (potentially) inﬁnite number of bargaining stages. At the beginning of each
stage one committee member is chosen at random to make a proposal ({xit}i=ni=1 , gt), which is then
voted on by all members of the committee. If a simple majority votes in favor, then the proposal
is implemented and the period ends. If it is voted down, then another bargaining stage (within
the same period) starts with a randomly selected member who submits a proposal and the process
repeats itself. There is no discounting between bargaining stages within the same period. A portion
of the public investment in period 1 survives until period 2, which creates the link between periods.6
We focus on the symmetric stationary subgame-perfect equilibria with strategies that are anonymous
between periods (legislative bargaining equilibrium hereafter). Given the strict concavity of u the
legislative bargaining equilibrium is unique in investment levels (IL
∗
1 , I
L∗
2 ).
The equilibrium of a two-period game shares two main features of the one-period game equi-
librium: (1) there are no delays on the equilibrium path as proposals are passed right away, and,
(2) conditional on public investment being an interior solution, the proposer enjoys higher pri-
vate share than any other member of the committee. As before, we discuss here the main forces
that govern public investment in each period and refer the reader to Appendix A for the detailed
characterization.
Conditional on the public investment in period 1, the maximization problem of a proposer in
period 2 involves choosing the cheapest proposal that will pass. There are three alternative routes
the proposer can take. The ﬁrst route is to invest all available funds in the public good, that is,
IL
∗
2 = B2. This route is optimal when the stock of the public good that survived from period 1 is
suﬃciently low, and such proposals pass with a unanimous vote. The second route is to distribute
5Notice that if there is no depreciation (δ = 1), then one of the constraints must be binding because the ﬁrst order
condition for period one reduces to u′(IP
∗
1 ) = 0, which cannot arise.
6It is straightforward to see that analysis presented below generalizes to any quota voting rule, where passage of
a proposal requires at least q supporting votes and 1 ≤ q < n.
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all the available budget in private shares to form a minimum winning coalition. This strategy is
optimal when the stock of public good is suﬃciently high. Finally, for intermediate levels of public
stock, the optimal strategy of the proposer involves investing portion of the budget in the public
good, rewarding n−12 randomly chosen members with private shares and appropriating the remaining
funds to herself. This interior level of period 2 public investment is characterized by the ﬁrst order
condition
period 2:
n+ 1
2
· u′(δIL1 + IL
∗
2 ) = 1 (2a)
The comparison between eﬃcient and bargaining level of public investment in period 2 when both
levels are interior is instructive (equations (1a) and (2a)). Both the social planner and a member
selected to propose an allocation in the bargaining game weigh the marginal beneﬁt of the public
investment against its marginal costs. While the marginal cost of public investment is the same in
both situations and equals to 1, the marginal beneﬁts are diﬀerent. The social planner takes into
account the fact that a unit of public investment beneﬁts all n committee members. On the contrary,
due to the speciﬁcs of the bargaining protocol (majority voting rule), the proposer internalizes the
eﬀect on n+12 members only, herself and
n−1
2 coalition partners. Thus, the bargaining solution
underprovides the public good relative to the eﬃcient solution in period 2. This underprovision is
purely static as it is present irrespectively of the survival rate of the public good δ (which is the only
dynamic component of our bargaining game). We, therefore, refer to this portion of underprovision
of public good as the static ineﬃciency.
The proposer selected in period 1 anticipates how her decisions will impact choices of the proposer
in period 2 through the accumulation of the public good that is carried over between periods given
the survival rate δ. When δ = 0 all public investment in period 1 depreciates and the two-period
legislative game becomes simply the one-period legislative game repeated twice. We refer to the
game with δ = 0 as the static game, since in this case there is no linkage between periods.7 When
δ > 0 additional dynamic forces are at play. The ﬁrst order condition that characterizes the interior
equilibrium investment in period 1, IL
∗
1 is:
period 1:
n+ 1
2
·
[
u′(IL
∗
1 ) +
dV2(I
L
1 )
dI1
|IL∗1
]
= 1 (2b)
where V2(I
L
1 ) represents the continuation value of the game at the beginning of period 2 before the
proposer has been selected. The left hand side reﬂects the distortions from the planner's solution due
to both static and dynamic free rider eﬀects. The ﬁrst term (n+12 u
′(IL∗1 )) represents the marginal
beneﬁt of the public good in period 1 to the proposer's coalition of n+12 voters (again, not the social
marginal beneﬁt). This the same static distortion that arises in period 2 and is present irrespectively
of value of δ. The second term captures the dynamic free riding eﬀect because it takes into account
how IL
∗
1 will aﬀect the proposer's (and her coalition partners') continuation value in period 2.
7Recall that we restricted our attention to the stationary sub-game perfect equilibria in which strategies cannot
condition on the identities of the committee members in the previous period.
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We distinguish between two separate dynamic eﬀects of public investment IL1 on the continuation
value V2: the direct one, which we refer to as the durability eﬀect and the indirect one, which we
call the crowding-out eﬀect.
The crowding-out eﬀect arises when neither of the budget or feasibility constraints are binding,
that is, IL
∗
1 < B1 and I
L∗
2 (I
L∗
1 ) > 0. In this case an increase in period 1 investment completely
crowds out period 2 investment. The intuition behind this movement is that the period 1 proposer
can reduce the side payments to coalition members by increasing V2(I
L
1 ) (by freeing up more period
2 budget for private allocations), and at the same time raise her own payoﬀ.
If in equilibrium the feasibility constraint in period 2 binds, that is, IL
∗
2 (I
L∗
1 ) = 0, then invest-
ment in period 1 will not substitute for investment in period 2 at the margin. Hence in this case,
the entire dynamic free riding eﬀect is due to the direct durability eﬀect. The portion of public
underprovision due to the durability eﬀect is larger when the survival rate δ is smaller.
To summarize, the bargaining solution in both periods underprovides the public good relative
to the eﬃcient planner's solution. One portion of this underprovision is static since it arises irre-
spectively of the ties between periods (captured by parameter δ in our game). The other portion,
present only in period 1, is dynamic and arises either due to the direct durability eﬀect or due to
the indirect crowding-out eﬀect. In the next section we discuss how one can separate these parts of
the free riding problem and estimate their magnitudes.
2.3 Identiﬁcation of dynamic ineﬃciencies
This paper aims to determine if subjects react to the dynamic aspects of public goods provision. If
they do, are there reactions to the static and dynamic free-ridding incentives similar to what theory
predicts as parameters of the environment change? Following the theoretical framework presented
above, we focus on the distortions in public good provision in period 1 and propose one natural way
to disentangle two source of ineﬃciencies (static versus dynamic), both of which contribute to the
low level of public good investment relative to the eﬃcient solution.
Let ∆S1 capture the diﬀerence in public good investment in period 1 between the eﬃcient and
bargaining solutions when the public good fully depreciates between periods (δ = 0). This is pure
static ineﬃciency, since it arises as a result of the proposer taking into account his inﬂuence only
on the utility of n+12 members of the committee in the current period and ignores the rest of the
legislators. Thus,
∆S1 = I
P ?
1 |δ=0 − IL
?
1 |δ=0.
When a portion of the public good investment survives between periods, i.e. δ > 0, the diﬀerence
between the planner's and bargaining investments in period 1 encompasses both static and dynamic
ineﬃciencies. We denote this amount by ∆T1 and refer to it as the total ineﬃciencies
∆T1 = I
P ?
1 |δ>0 − IL
?
1 |δ>0.
Subtracting the static portion of ineﬃciencies from the total ones gives us the dynamic ineﬃ-
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ciencies that arise only in the dynamic setup
∆D1 = ∆
T
1 −∆S1 .
Depending on the parameters of the game, this dynamic distortion captures either the crowding-
out eﬀect (when IL
?
2 > 0) or the durability eﬀect (when I
L?
2 = 0).
It is straightforward to verify that ∆T1 (δ) is increasing in δ. In other words, the smaller the
depreciation of the public good between periods, the larger is the total ineﬃciency. Since static
ineﬃciencies do not change with δ, this means that ∆D1 (δ) is also increasing in δ. In other words,
the stronger the link between periods (the smaller the depreciation rate) the bigger the portion
of underprovision that come from the dynamic rather than the static nature of the bargaining.
Furthermore, this comparative static implies that the durability eﬀect is always larger than the
crowding-out eﬀect, since as one increases the value of δ the dynamic ineﬃciencies increase and we
shift from the region in which all dynamic ineﬃciencies are due to the crowding-out eﬀect to the
region in which all dynamic ineﬃciencies are due to the durability eﬀect.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Parameterization
Our experimental design naturally requires the use of a speciﬁc parametric public investment func-
tion. In particular, we focus on the power function u(g) = 5
√
g.8 To create the simplest possible
environment, which captures all the forces described in the previous section, we consider committees
of three bargainers (n = 3) that meet for two consecutive periods. In each period, the committee
needs to decide how to allocate a budget of 200 tokens (B1 = B2 = B = 200) between public good
investment and pork to each member of the committee. We conduct all the experiments using the
Baron-Ferejohn bargaining protocol described above and document participants' behavior in the
legislative bargaining game. We then compare this behavior to the theoretical planner's solution to
measure ineﬃciencies that arise from bargaining using the identiﬁcation strategy described above.
We conduct three treatments, which diﬀer only in the value of δ, the survival rate of the public
investment. The ﬁrst treatment has δ = 0, and, thus, we refer to it as the static bargaining game and
denote it by SB. The other two treatments are dynamic bargaining games, one with a low survival
rate, δ = 0.2 (DBlow), and one with high survival rate of δ = 0.8 (DBhigh).9 These two positive
values of δ were chosen in a way that allows us to distinguish two types of dynamic ineﬃciencies:
crowding-out and durability eﬀects.
Table 1 displays the predicted values of public investment and private allocations in each period,
and in each treatment as a percentage of the budget. We also present theoretical values for static,
8The choice of this functional form was motivated by the desire to choose simple and `familiar' to subjects function
which is easy to describe in the instructions and present graphically.
9Recall that the survival rate of public investment is the inverse of the depreciation rate. That is, δ = 0 indicates
full depreciation, δ = 0.2 indicates high depreciation, and δ = 0.8 indicates low depreciation rate.
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dynamic and total ineﬃciencies using the planner's solution.10
When δ = 0, all period 1 ineﬃciencies are solely static (see the third column under the SB
heading). In this case, the planner allocates an extra 15.5% of the budget to investment. When δ
increases to 0.2 and we move to the DBlow game, dynamic ineﬃciencies emerge and total ineﬃciencies
add up to 27.3% of the budget. In this case the dynamic ineﬃciencies are entirely due to crowding-
out eﬀect since IL
∗
2 > 0. In terms of magnitude, dynamic ineﬃciencies account for 11.8% of the
budget and 43% of the total ineﬃciencies. The relative importance of dynamic ineﬃciencies changes
dramatically when we further increase δ to 0.8 and move to the DBhigh game. In this game dynamic
ineﬃciencies are entirely due to the durability eﬀect (IL
∗
2 = 0) and they account for almost 40%
of the budget as well as 72% of total ineﬃciencies. Although there are diﬀerences in magnitudes,
dynamic ineﬃciencies represent a substantial and non-negligible amount of total ineﬃciencies in
both DBlow and DBhigh games.
Table 1: Theoretical Outcomes as % of Budget
Static Barg Dynamic Barg with δ = 0.2 Dynamic Barg with δ = 0.8
SB DBlow DBhigh
P ∗ L∗ ∆S1 P
∗ L∗ ∆T1 ∆
D
1
∆D1
∆T1
P ∗ L∗ ∆T1 ∆
D
1
∆D1
∆T1
Period 1
public good I1 28.0 12.5 15.5 44.0 16.7 27.3 11.8 0.43 100 44.9 55.1 39.6 0.72
total private goods X1 72.0 87.5 56.0 83.3 0.0 55.1
proposer xPr1 58.4 55.6 36.8
coalition member xC1 29.1 27.7 18.3
other xNonC1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Period 2
public good I2 28.0 12.5 19.4 9.2 0.0 0.0
total private goods X2 72.0 87.5 80.6 90.8 100 100
proposer xPr2 58.4 60.5 66.7
coalition member xC2 29.1 30.3 33.3
other xNonC2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: P ∗ denotes Planner's solution, L∗ denotes Legislative Bargaining equilibrium, ∆S denotes Static Ineﬃciency,
∆T denotes Total Ineﬃciencies and ∆D denotes Dynamic Ineﬃciency.
We note that the parameters of the game were chosen in a way that gives separation between
theoretically predicted investment levels in period 1 in dynamic games (44.9% versus 16.7% of the
budget) and at the same time result in a similar average expected payment for subjects. The latter
property allows to controls for subjects' incentives between treatments, while the former property
is important for interpreting the results of the experiments. The consequence of these parameter
choices, however, is that total welfare (the sum of periods' 1 and 2 welfares) in the legislative
bargaining equilibrium is almost identical in two dynamic treatments, DBlow and DBhigh. Hence,
10The analysis in the theory section shows that dynamic ineﬃciencies are driven by the period 1 investment decision.
For this reason we measure ineﬃciencies in Table 1 and derive hypotheses using period 1 investment. Section 4.5
presents the analysis of ineﬃciencies using aggregate welfare.
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our main focus in this paper will be on period 1 investments.
3.2 Experimental Interface and Procedures
We conducted sessions at CASSEL (UCLA) and CESS (NYU) using Multistage software (see Table
2).11 In each location, subjects were recruited from the general undergraduate pool and each
subject participated at most in one session. Sessions consisted of 12 or 15 participants.12 We
refer the reader to Appendix B for a copy of the instructions that subjects received, screen shots,
the detailed script of the practice round and the quiz that was conducted to make sure subjects
understand the structure of the game and payoﬀs.13
Table 2: Subjects per treatment
Treatment UCLA NYU
Static Barg (SB) 45 (3 sessions)
Dynamic Barg with δ = 0.2 (DBlow) 42 (3 sessions)
Dynamic Barg with δ = 0.8 (DBhigh) 30 (2 sessions) 24 (2 sessions)
In each session subjects played 10 repetitions of the two-period game and we refer to each
repetition as a match. In each match subjects were randomly assigned to groups of three. We
describe here the main features of the interface. To reduce the computational diﬃculties, subjects
saw on the screen a graph that depicts how dollars (tokens) invested in the project are converted
into payoﬀs.14 At the beginning of each period, all subjects were asked to choose how they would
distribute the available budget between private allocations and the public investment (referred to
as the project investment in the instructions). The instructions emphasized how investment in
period 1 can generate payoﬀs in period 2 for dynamic treatments.15 After all subjects in a group
submitted their proposal, one of the three proposals was selected at random (with equal probability)
and presented to all group members for a vote. If the proposal was accepted by a majority of votes
(at least two out of three), then the period was over and the group moved on to the second period of
the game, in which again all subjects were asked to submit their proposal and one of the proposals
was chosen at random. If, however, the proposal was rejected, then the group remained in the
11We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the behavior of subjects at NYU and at UCLA.
12The two sessions of DBhigh that we conducted at NYU and one session of DBlow involved 12 subjects. All other
sessions involved 15 subjects.
13Upon their arrival to the lab, subjects were sited in a separated cubicles and handed printed instructions. After
all participating subjects entered the lab, the experimenter read the instructions out loud and answered any questions
that subjects had. After that, all subjects participated in a practice round, during which the experimenter read the
script describing the software interface and showed the slideshow with screenshots. Finally, after the practice round,
subjects were asked to answer 16 questions about rules of the game. Subjects had to answer all questions correctly
to be able to begin the experiment. This quiz was conducted after the practice round and before the beginning of
the paid rounds.
14Earlier pilot sessions were conducted with a diﬀerent (less visual) interface. Those data are available upon request.
Although the change to a more visual interface was motivated by our worry that the computational demands were
high, there is no clear indication that this aﬀected the results.
15The instructions included a table that explains for investment levels from 0 to 200 (in intervals of 10), how
investment in period 1 will translate into period 2 payoﬀs (see Charness et al. (2004) for an example of the importance
of payoﬀ tables). Moreover, subjects were explicitly asked to go over this table when answering the quiz. Subjects in
all three treatments received such a table. An example of this table is presented in Appendix B.
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ﬁrst period and another bargaining stage started in which all members were asked to submit a new
proposal. Throughout the experiment, subjects could follow the full history of the experiment in a
box at the bottom of the screen. At the end of the session one match was selected at random for
payment, earnings in that match were divided by 10 and the resulting ﬁgure plus the participation
fee ($10) paid to participants in dollars. Average earnings were approximately $30 and each session
took about 2 hours.
3.3 Experimental Hypotheses
We use four main hypotheses to organize the experimental results. Our ﬁrst hypothesis highlights
the fundamental diﬀerence between dynamic and static bargaining games with respect to public
investment in periods 1 and 2. While, naturally, public investment is expected to be the same in
both periods in the static game, this is not the case in the dynamic game, in which period 1 public
investment is predicted to be higher than period 2 public investment. We call this hypothesis the
horizon eﬀect hypothesis and summarize it as follows.
Horizon eﬀect hypothesis: ISB1 = I
SB
2 and I
DBj
1 > I
DBj
2 for j ∈ {high, low}
The second hypothesis compares public good investment in period 1 across treatments and asserts
that investment in the public good increases with the survival rate of the public good. We refer
to this prediction as the investment hypothesis and note that it captures another essential feature
of the dynamic game, namely that the beneﬁt of investing in the ﬁrst period is higher when the
depreciation rate is lower.
Investment hypothesis: ISB1 < I
DBlow
1 < I
DBhigh
1
The third hypothesis compares the magnitudes of under-provision across treatments, thus, the name
under-provision hypothesis. In particular, the higher the survival rate δ, the bigger the gap between
the bargaining and the planner solution.16
Under-provision hypothesis: 0 < ∆T1 |SB < ∆T1
∣∣
DBlow < ∆
T
1
∣∣
DBhigh
The fourth hypothesis compares the two sources of dynamic ineﬃciencies that are present in the
dynamic treatments. We refer to this prediction as the dynamic ineﬃciency hypothesis and expect
that the durability eﬀect dominates the crowding-out eﬀect.
Dynamic ineﬃciency hypothesis: 0 < ∆D1
∣∣
DBlow < ∆
D
1
∣∣
DBhigh
16Since in the SB treatment there can be no dynamic ineﬃciencies, total ineﬃciencies are equal to static ineﬃcien-
cies. Hence, in the under-provision hypothesis ∆T1 |SB = ∆S1 .
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4 Aggregate Results
In this section we present aggregate results. We start by exploring the four hypotheses outlined
in the previous section, all of which use period 1 public investment as a measure of ineﬃciencies
(see Sections 4.1 - 4.4). We proceed by exploring the welfare implications of period 1 decisions in
Section 4.5, in which we are concerned with the total surplus generated in both periods. In Section
5 we zoom in on the individual behavior of subjects to account for the variation that aggregate data
abstracts away from. Since the focus of this paper is on public provision in dynamic environments,
most of the aggregate and individual results will concern public investments and total welfare. We
refer the reader to Appendix C in which we discuss other characteristics of the bargaining process
such as the frequency of delays, the distribution of private allocations between committee members,
and the determinants of voting behavior.
4.1 Horizon Eﬀect Hypothesis
The two-period bargaining game analyzed in Section 2 is a relatively challenging environment. On
the one hand, behavior in the two periods is interdependent and, on the other hand, behavior
is predicted to be diﬀerent across periods in all but the static treatment. We, therefore, start
by assessing whether subjects internalize the fundamental diﬀerence between dynamic and static
bargaining environments by comparing period 1 and period 2 public investments. According to the
horizon eﬀect hypothesis, period 2 public investment in both dynamic treatments is predicted to
be smaller than period 1 public investment. This is true for both the eﬃcient solution and the
equilibrium bargaining solution as depicted in Table 1. The intuition for this result comes from the
fact that while the utility of the public good is the same in both periods, the initial stock of the
public good in period 2 is at least as high as the one in period 1 since δ > 0 and public investment
in period 1 is non-negative. On the contrary, in the SB treatment, in which δ = 0, the public
investment in both periods is expected to be the same.
Table 3: Median Investment in each period as % of the Budget (last 5 matches)
Static Barg Dynamic Barg with δ = 0.2 Dynamic Barg with δ = 0.8
SB DBlow DBhigh
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Planner's solution 28.0 28.0 44.0 19.4 100.0 0.0
Legislative Barg eq 12.5 12.5 16.7 9.2 44.9 0.0
Observed (all proposals) 10.0 10.0∗∗∗ 31.8∗ 5.0 55.0 0.0
Notes: The table reports the signiﬁcance level of a test using a quantile regression where the null hypothesis is that the
median equals the legislative bargaining equilibrium. (See Table 13 in Appendix C for further details.) Signiﬁcance
indicates a statistical diﬀerence from the prediction: *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 3 displays median investment levels per period in each treatment in the last 5 matches
along with the theoretical predictions for the eﬃcient solution and that of the legislative bargaining
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equilibrium.17 As apparent from Table 3, our data supports the horizon eﬀect hypothesis as public
investment in period 2 is smaller than the one in period 1 in both dynamic treatments and is not
diﬀerent in the static treatment. This is conﬁrmed by statistical tests.18 Notice also that the
observed median public investment in both periods is signiﬁcantly smaller than the eﬃcient levels
chosen by benevolent planner in all three treatments. The one exception is period 2 for the DBhigh
treatment in which the eﬃcient solution predicts zero investment given that a large fraction of public
investment from period 1 survived until period 2. We note that qualitative results do not change
when one looks at the average investment levels instead of the median ones or at all 10 matches of
the experiment rather than the last 5 matches.19
Finding 1: Aggregate data supports the horizon eﬀect hypothesis and indicates that subjects have
a basic understanding of the dynamic tensions in the bargaining environment.
4.2 Investment Hypothesis
Table 4 presents the observed average and median investment in period 1 in the last 5 matches as
well as the eﬃcient and bargaining solutions.20 Observed investment is presented for two categories
of proposals. The ﬁrst category comprises all proposals submitted by all members of each group
in the ﬁrst stage of period 1. The second category includes proposals that satisfy the minimum
winning coalition (MWC) condition, which are deﬁned as proposals in which n−12 members of the
committee receive a private allocation of no more than 10% of the budget and n+12 members receive
strictly more than 10% of the budget in private allocations.21 The subset of proposals that were
randomly chosen to be voted on and received a majority of votes looks very similar to the ﬁrst
17For the analysis from now on we restrict our attention to the stage in which a proposal was accepted. For the
stage in which a proposal was accepted we consider all proposals submitted by members of the committee. This means
that for each match and each period we include in the analysis three proposals by committee, so that no particular
period or match is given a higher weight. Because a large majority of ﬁrst-stage proposals pass, the analysis is not
qualitatively aﬀected.
18To test for the diﬀerence in medians the unit of observation is each proposal per match. That is, for each subject
and each match we keep track of the period 1 and period 2 investment proposals, and construct a variable that tracks
the diﬀerence between period 1 and period 2 investment. We estimate the conditional median of the diﬀerence by
performing a quantile regression, with the diﬀerence in investment on the left-hand side and a constant as a control.
The estimated constant is not statistically diﬀerent from zero in the static treatment, but signiﬁcant at the 1% level
for dynamic treatments. (See Table 11 in Appendix C.) From now on we will use quantile regressions when we
provide a test on the median. When we test for diﬀerences in means we use a random-eﬀects panel regression with
the variable of interest on the left-hand side and a control for the intended test on the right-hand side. In all our
tests we cluster standard errors by session. In the text we will use the term `statistically signiﬁcant' when we can
reject the null at 5%.
19When we use mean values, ﬁndings are qualitatively unchanged. (See Table 11 in Appendix C.) In the static
treatment, the mean of the diﬀerence between period 1 and period 2 investment is relatively small (3.8%), but it is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In the bargaining treatments diﬀerences in investment across periods are also
statistically signiﬁcant, but much larger: 24.3 and 41.1% in the DBlow and DBhigh cases respectively. Results using
all matches are presented in Table 12 of Appendix C.
20We discuss the evolution of sessions in Appendix C.
21Note that the deﬁnition of MWC suggests that diﬀerent members of committees are treated diﬀerently with
respect to their private allocations: some are included in the coalition while others are not. Thus, proposals that
involve investing the whole budget in the public investment, and, therefore, treat all members equally, do not satisfy
the MWC condition. Allowing non-coalition partners to receive small shares is standard in the literature.
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category of all proposals and, therefore, omitted for brevity.22
Table 4: Investment in Period 1 as % of Budget (last 5 matches)
Static Barg Dynamic Barg δ = 0.2 Dynamic Barg δ = 0.8
SB DBlow DBhigh
mean median st. err. mean median st. err. mean median st. err.
Planner's solution 28.0 44.0 100.0
Bargaining solution 12.5 16.7 44.9
Observed
(a) all proposals 16.7 10.0 13.4 38.7∗∗∗ 31.8∗ 31.9 55.2∗∗ 55.0 32.7
(b) MWC proposals 11.1 10.0∗∗∗ 7.3 18.3 10.0 20.3 29.3∗∗∗ 25.0∗∗∗ 20.1
Notes: The table reports the signiﬁcance level of a test using a random eﬀects (quantile) regression where the null
hypothesis is that the mean (median) equals the bargaining equilibrium. (See Tables 14 and 15 in Appendix C.) Sig-
niﬁcance indicates a statistical diﬀerence from the prediction: *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant
at 1%.
To test the investment hypotheses outlined above, we decompose it into three pairwise compar-
isons and test each separately: ISB1 < I
DBlow
1 , I
SB
1 < I
DBhigh
1 and I
DBlow
1 < I
DBhigh
1 . Furthermore, we
test these three inequalities for two categories of proposals (a) and (b) separately, where we take the
proposal of a subject as the unit of observation. For category (a) we take all proposals, while for
category (b) we take only those proposals that satisfy the MWC requirement. To test diﬀerences
in the mean, we run a random eﬀects regression that uses the quantity of interest on the left-hand
side and varies the right-hand side depending on the speciﬁc test. For instance, to test whether
public investment in period 1 is higher in the DBlow than in the SB treatment, the right-hand side
includes the constant and a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the proposal is from DBlow. We
always cluster standard errors by session.
Our analysis largely reveals that public investment monotonically increases with the survival
rate δ irrespectively of whether one focuses on all submitted proposals or proposals that satisfy
MWC condition. The treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant at 5% level in all pairwise comparisons except
for two cases. The median investment in SB is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than in DBlow, and
median investment in DBhigh is signiﬁcantly higher than DBlow at the 10% level (p-value 0.087). In
addition, investment levels are generally higher when we compare all proposals to proposals that
involve MWCs.23
Finding 2: Investment in the public good increases with the survival rate of the public good as
predicted by the investment hypothesis.
22Consistent with the previous literature, we ﬁnd that a majority of proposals are passed without delay in all three
treatments and in both periods of the game. These results are presented in Appendix C.
23Details of the statistical tests are available in Appendix C: Table 16 (for the median) and Table 17 (for the mean).
The output in tables 18 and Table 19 shows that the conclusions do not change if we use all 10 matches.
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4.3 Under-provision Hypothesis
Table 5 presents predicted and observed distortions in period one public investment as well as its
decomposition into the static and dynamic components. We use this information to examine the
under-provision hypothesis, according to which the total ineﬃciencies in period 1 public provision
monotonically increase with the survival rate of the public good.
Table 5: Total and Dynamic Ineﬃciencies (as % of Budget)
Static Barg Dynamic Barg δ = 0.2 Dynamic Barg δ = 0.8
SB DBlow DBhigh
I1 Planner Barg ∆S1 Planner Barg ∆
T
1 ∆
D
1
∆D1
∆T1
Planner Barg ∆T1 ∆
D
1
∆D1
∆T1
Theory 28.0 12.5 15.5 44.0 16.7 27.3 11.8 0.43 100 44.9 55.1 39.6 0.72
Proposals
(a) All
mean 16.7 11.3 38.7∗∗∗ 5.3 -6.0 - 55.2∗∗ 44.8 33.5 0.75
median 10.0 18.0 31.8∗ 12.2 -5.8 - 55.0 45.0 27.0 0.60
(b) MWC
mean 11.1 16.9 18.3 25.7 8.8 0.34 29.3∗∗∗ 70.7 53.8 0.76
median 10.0∗∗∗ 18.0 10.0 34.0 16.0 0.47 25.0∗∗∗ 75.0 57.0 0.76
Planner: Planner's solution, Barg: Legislative Bargaining solution
∆S1 : Static Ineﬃciencies, ∆
D
1 : Dynamic Ineﬃciencies, ∆
T
1 : Total Ineﬃciencies
Observed ∆S1 ,∆
T
1 computed using theoretical values for the planner's problem.
In each category (a) and (b) we use ﬁrst period investment in the last ﬁve matches
For the Bargaining column in each treatment, the table reports the signiﬁcance level of a test using a random eﬀects
(quantile) regression where the null hypothesis is that the mean (median) equals the bargaining equilibrium. (See Tables 14
and 15 in Appendix C.) Signiﬁcance indicates a statistical diﬀerence from the prediction: *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at
5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Table 5 shows that the estimated magnitudes of distortions are sensitive to the category of
proposals one focuses on. If we constrain proposals to those involving MWCs (category (b)), then
we ﬁnd support for the under-provision hypothesis. In other words, proposals that satisfy the MWC
condition exhibit the following pattern: the total amount of under-provision in these proposals
relative to the eﬃcient solution increases with the survival rate of the public good and this increase
is statistically signiﬁcant between any two pairs of treatments at the 5% level.24
However, the picture is diﬀerent if one looks at all submitted proposals. For this category, the
under-provision hypothesis holds only partially. The total amount of ineﬃciency is signiﬁcantly
higher in the DBhigh treatment than in either the static SB treatment or the dynamic DBlow treat-
ment at the 1% level. However, we do not observe a signiﬁcant change in the total ineﬃciencies
when moving from δ = 0 to δ = 0.2, which corresponds to SB and DBlow treatments respectively.
Finding 3: Consistent with the hypothesis, public good under-provision in the DBhigh treatment is
24We use the same statistical analysis described in Section 3.2. That, is we use a random-eﬀects panel regression
to test diﬀerences in mean ∆T1 and quantile regression analysis to test diﬀerences in median ∆
T
1 . Tables 20 and 21 in
Appendix C show the output.
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higher than in the SB and DBlow treatments. Under-provision is statistically higher in DBlow than
in the SB treatment for MWC proposals.
4.4 Dynamic Ineﬃciency Hypothesis
Our last hypothesis investigates the presence and relative magnitude of the dynamic ineﬃciencies in
DBlow and DBhigh treatments. To statistically examine the presence of dynamic ineﬃciencies we run
a random eﬀects regression for each DB treatment with period 1 investment on the left-hand side.25
In the DBhigh case, the right-hand side variables are a constant and a dummy that takes value 1 if
the proposal corresponds to the DBhigh treatment and 0 if it corresponds to SB. We then contrast
the estimated coeﬃcient with the theoretical increase in the planner's investment relative to the SB
case, which equals 72% (100%− 28%). The estimated coeﬃcient on the dummy using all proposals
is 38.5% (19.2% using proposals that satisfy the MWC condition), which is signiﬁcantly less than
72% at the 1% level (using either all submitted or all MWC proposals). Thus, there is evidence
of dynamic ineﬃciencies in the DBhigh treatment. In a similar analysis of the DBlow treatment,
the estimated coeﬃcient implies that investment in the DBlow treatment is 22% higher than in the
SB if we use all proposals (7.6% if we only use MWC proposals). The theoretical increase in the
planner's investment is 16% (44%−28%). Therefore, for the DBlow treatment, we ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence for MWC proposals.26
While we expect dynamic ineﬃciencies to be present in both dynamic treatments, the source of
the dynamic ineﬃciencies in each treatment is diﬀerent, as discussed in Section 2.2. In the DBhigh
treatment, the dynamic portion of under-provision is attributed to the durability eﬀect, which arises
when feasibility constraint in period 2 binds and becomes more important as the survival rate δ
becomes smaller. On the contrary, in the DBlow treatment dynamic under-provision is entirely due
to the crowding-out eﬀect, which arises when neither the budget nor feasibility constraints bind, and
becomes smaller as δ decreases. For the parameters used in our experiments, the theory predicts
that the durability eﬀect should be larger than the crowding-out eﬀect. As evident from estimated
coeﬃcients reported in the previous paragraph, our data indicates that the observed durability and
crowding-out eﬀects are, respectively, smaller than the corresponding theoretical prediction. Despite
the fact that the observed magnitudes of the two eﬀects are lower than the predicted ones, we ﬁnd
that the two eﬀects obey the ranking predicted by theory: indeed, the durability eﬀect is larger in
magnitude than the crowding-out eﬀect both when we focus on all submitted proposals as well as
only the MWC proposals.27
25The output of these regressions is presented in Table 17 of Appendix C.
26The conclusions are similar if we focus on median investment instead (see Table 16 of Appendix C) or all matches
(see tables 18 and 19 of Appendix C).
27We run a random eﬀects regression where the dependent variable is period 1 investment and the right-hand side
involves a constant and a dummy that takes value 1 if the proposal comes from DBhigh and zero if it comes from
DBlow. The coeﬃcient of the dummy variable is signiﬁcant at the 1% level if we use all submitted or all MWC
proposals. The same ﬁnding holds if we focus on median investment. See tables 16 and 17 of Appendix C for details.
In addition, we can contrast the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable to the theoretical increase in optimal investment.
In DBhigh, optimal period 1 investment is 100%, while on DBlow it equals 44%. Hence, there would be evidence of
no additional dynamic ineﬃciencies in DBhigh if the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable was equal to 56%. This null
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Finding 4: Dynamic ineﬃciencies due to durability eﬀect are signiﬁcant and large in magnitude
in the DBhigh treatment irrespectively of whether one focuses on all submitted or MWC proposals.
In the DBlow treatment, we observe signiﬁcant dynamic ineﬃciencies due to crowding-out eﬀect
only for MWC proposals. Moreover, consistent with the theory, we ﬁnd that the durability eﬀect
dominates the crowding-out eﬀect.
4.5 Welfare
Up until now, the analysis has focused on period 1 investment decisions, which are a key determinant
of ﬁnal welfare of a group as explained in Section 2. Other things equal, a sub-optimal period 1
investment would lead to a welfare loss as measured by total surplus generated by a group in both
periods. In other words, a dynamic ineﬃciency in terms of public investment would correspond to
a dynamic ineﬃciency in terms of welfare. However, it is possible that subjects react in period 2
to sub-optimal period 1 investment in a way that may at least partially oﬀset welfare losses from
the period 1 underinvestment. In this section we investigate the possibility that such compensation
occurs by deﬁning a welfare measure that incorporates public investments in both period 1 and
period 2.
Deﬁne the measure of a group's welfare as the additional surplus generated on top of the mini-
mum possible welfare that a group is guaranteed to achieve, absent any public investments in either
period. Speciﬁcally, this measure, W , is deﬁned as:
W =
3∑
i=1
xi1 + 3u (g1) +
3∑
i=1
xi2 + 3u (g2)− 2B.
In other words, W adds up payoﬀs of all three group members in both periods and subtracts
2B, which is the lowest possible total payoﬀ that a group can obtain by distributing all available
budget in private shares and not investing at all in either period.
This welfare measure can also be used to break down the total eﬃciency losses into those
attributable to static and dynamic ineﬃciencies, in a similar way to the earlier analysis of period
1 investment decisions. The results of this alternative approach are presented in the ﬁrst row of
Table 6. First, for each treatment separately, the table presents theoretical values forW both in the
eﬃcient and in the legislative bargaining solution (denoted WP
∗
and WL
∗
, respectively). Second,
the table shows the total ineﬃciency relative to the planner's solution (∆W T ) and decomposes it
into static and dynamic components (∆WS and ∆WD, respectively). The results are very similar
to the calculations presented in Table 5, which reported the same analysis, but with respect to
period 1 public investments instead of W . In particular, the under-provision hypothesis can be
stated in terms of welfare instead of period 1 decisions as ∆WS < ∆W T |DBlow < ∆W T |DBhigh .
Similarly, the dynamic ineﬃciency hypothesis can be stated using the welfare-based measure as
0 < ∆WD|DBlow < ∆WD|DBhigh .
hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level for the median and the mean. Again, see tables 16 and 17 of Appendix C for
details.
19
Before discussing our ﬁndings, it should be noted that a potential drawback from using W
as a measure of ineﬃciencies instead of period 1 investment is that it is based on many fewer
observations, for the following reason. In order to measure W one must include period 1 and period
2 proposals, and hence only period 1 proposals that were randomly selected (and passed) can be
used.28 For period 1 proposals that were either not selected or failed to pass one does not observe
the period 2 proposals they would have triggered. Hence, one must drop period 1 proposals that
were not selected for a vote, or failed to pass, which represents more than two-thirds of the period
1 investment data.29
Table 6: Welfare measure: theory and observed outcomes
Static Barg Dynamic Barg δ = 0.2 Dynamic Barg δ = 0.8
SB DBlow DBhigh
WP
∗
WL
∗
∆WS WP
∗
WL
∗
∆WT ∆WD ∆W
D
∆WT
WP
∗
WL
∗
∆WT ∆WD ∆W
D
∆WT
Theory 112.5 100 12.5 126.6 109.9 16.7 4.2 0.25 201.9 179.4 22.5 9.9 0.44
Proposals
(a) All
mean 91.5∗∗∗ 21.0 97.6∗∗ 29.0 8.0 0.28 169.4∗ 32.5 11.5 0.35
median 94.2∗ 18.3 107.9 18.7 0.4 0.02 180.1 21.8 3.5 0.16
(b) MWC
mean 92.1∗∗∗ 20.4 89.4∗∗∗ 37.2 16.8 0.45 167.0∗∗∗ 34.9 14.5 0.42
median 94.2∗∗∗ 18.3 103.5 23.1 4.8 0.21 169.6 32.3 14.0 0.43
WP
∗
, WL
∗
Welfare Measure under the Planner's and Legislative Bargaining solution, respectively
∆WS = WP
∗ |SB −WL∗ |SB (Static Ineﬃciencies), ∆WT = WP∗ |DB −WL∗ |DB (Total Ineﬃciencies),
∆WD = ∆WT −∆WS (Dynamic Ineﬃciencies)
Observed ∆WS ,∆WT computed using theoretical values for the planner's problem.
In each category (a) and (b) we use mean investment in the last ﬁve matches
For the Bargaining column in each treatment, the table reports the signiﬁcance level of a test using a random eﬀects
(quantile) regression where the null hypothesis is that the mean (median) equals the bargaining equilibrium. (See Tables 22
and 23 in Appendix C.) Signiﬁcance indicates a statistical diﬀerence from the prediction: *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at
5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Table 6 presents eﬃciency levels observed in each treatment as well as their decomposition in
terms of static and dynamic under-provision. We present data for all proposals (rows 2 and 3) as well
as only for the proposals that involved minimum winning coalitions in both periods (rows 4 and 5).
Reported results are qualitatively in line with the predictions and the ﬁndings previously reported.
Consider ﬁrst the under-provision hypothesis, which ranks ineﬃciencies between treatments from the
smallest in the SB treatment to the highest in the DBhigh treatment. The data provide qualitative
support of this hypothesis, as the highest average and median level of ineﬃciencies are observed in
the DBhigh treatment, and the lowest average and median level in the SB treatment, when focusing
28If we computed a partial measure using only period 1 proposals, part of the welfare consequences of suboptimal
period 1 choices would be missing. More importantly, the missing portion would diﬀer across treatments, as the eﬀect
of period 1 choices on period 2 welfare depends on δ.
29For each period 1 proposal that passed we can compute W for all period 2 proposals (those that were selected
for a vote and passed and those that were not).
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on all proposals.30 When we restrict our attention to proposals that satisfy requirement of MWC
in both periods, the ordering is preserved for the median levels of ineﬃciencies and reversed for the
average level of ineﬃciencies in the two dynamic treatments. We note that the comparison between
means in the two dynamic treatments is severely aﬀected by a few outliers.31 Consider now the
dynamic ineﬃciency hypothesis, which predicts that the magnitude of dynamic ineﬃciencies in the
DBhigh treatment should be higher than that in the DBlow treatment. Except for the means of the
proposals that satisfy MWC in both periods, in all other cases the data support this hypothesis.32
Finally, observe that period 2 public investment decisions do not compensate for the suboptimal
public investments in period 1. For this reason, measuring ineﬃciencies using W leads to similar
qualitative conclusions as measuring ineﬃciencies using period 1 public investments.
5 Individual Data Analysis
Our previous results considered aggregate level data. These results suggest relatively high degree
of heterogeneity in public investment decisions across subjects (see, for example, the standard
errors reported in Table 3). In this section we look at the individual level data with the aim of
documenting and studying in more depth the main types of strategies used by our subjects. This
section is structured as follows. First, we deﬁne three types of strategies and show that these types
capture the vast majority of the observed public investments. Then we document the popularity
of each type of strategy and look at their prevalence as the sessions evolve. Second, for each type
of strategy we compare public investments in both periods to the optimal investments conditional
on the type of strategy used. Third, we consider payoﬀs associated with the use of each type of
30To perform the statistical tests, we use the same statistical types of regressions as the one described in Section 4.3.
We ﬁnd that mean total ineﬃciencies in DBhigh are signiﬁcantly higher at the 5% level than those in SB treatment
using all proposals or those that satisfy MWCs. The same ﬁnding holds for the comparison between the DBlow and
SB treatments, with a p-value of 0.069 for the comparison between means. For other comparisons the diﬀerences are
not statistically signiﬁcant at standard levels. See tables 24 and 25 in Appendix C for more details.
31Notice ﬁrst that the reported averages are not in line with the prediction for the MWC proposals, with the highest
total ineﬃciency achieved in the DBlow treatment. An observation involves a MWC if the period 1 and the period
2 proposals involve MWCs. This requirement further reduces the dataset in addition to looking only at the period
1 proposals that passed, and eventually a few outliers can substantially aﬀect the average. In the DBlow treatment,
there are 67 MWC proposals. Six of these proposals involve no investment in either period, leading to a W of zero.
If these six proposals are excluded, the mean moves from 37.2 to 28.4, and the ordering of total ineﬃciencies is again
in line with the theoretical predictions. The outliers almost do not aﬀect the median, which moves from 23.1 to
22.5. In terms of statistical tests, the results for the mean depend on the outliers. If the outliers are included, total
ineﬃciencies in DBlow are substantially higher than in SB, but not diﬀerent than in DBhigh (see Table 25 in Appendix
C). If the outliers are excluded, then there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between DBlow and SB. The evidence suggests
that the signiﬁcance of estimates is aﬀected by sample size as well. Tables 26 and 27 show the estimates using all
10 matches but excluding the outliers where W = 0 (that are only present in DBlow). Median total ineﬃciencies in
MWC proposals are higher in DBhigh than in DBlow (5% level), and in DBhigh relative to SB (at the 1% level). A
similar ﬁnding holds for the mean.
32In order to provide a statistical test we proceed as in Section 4.4. To establish if there are dynamic ineﬃciencies
in DB treatments, we run a random eﬀects regression for each DB treatment, where W is on the left-hand side and a
treatment dummy (1: corresponding DB treatment, 0: SB) on the right-hand side. When then compare the estimated
coeﬃcient to the theoretical increase in the planner's welfare (201.9-112.5=89.4 in DBhigh, and 126.6-112.5=14.1 in
DBlow). For DBhigh we ﬁnd that either using all proposals or those that satisfy MWC we can reject the null hypothesis
(at the 5% level) that the coeﬃcient is equal to 89.4. For the DBlow treatment, we can reject the null at the 5% level
for MWC proposals and at the 10% for all proposals. See Table 28 in Appendix C for details.
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strategy and study whether these payoﬀ diﬀerences can account for the diﬀerences in the use of the
strategies between treatments. Finally, we provide some insights into the rationale for the observed
strategies.
5.1 Types of strategies and evolution of their use
A strategy in our two period dynamic game is a proposal in period 1, and a period 2 proposal for
each of period 1's possible outcomes. In our data we partially observe period 2 choices, as we learn
each subject's period 2 proposal only for the proposal that passed in period 1. In this section, the
unit of observation will be the subject's choice in both periods of the match and, even though this
is an abuse of terminology, we will refer to it as the subject's strategy. There are three types of
strategies that account for the vast majority of observed choices:
• MM strategies
Involve forming MWCs in both periods (hence the name MM), where MWC proposals are
deﬁned as above.
• EE strategies
Involve splitting beneﬁts equally between all three members in both periods (hence the name
EE), where we deﬁne as an equal split any proposal in which the diﬀerence in private alloca-
tions between any two members is not larger than 5 tokens (2.5% of the budget).33
• EM strategies
Involve splitting resources equally in period 1 and forming MWC in period 2 (hence the name
EM).
Figure 1 plots the proportion of subjects who submit a proposal of each identiﬁed strategy
type by match in each treatment. The ﬁrst observation is that classifying proposals into the three
strategy types outlined above accounts for the vast majority of all observed choices: 88% in SB game
and 94% in either of the DB games in the last 5 matches (see also the dotted line that represents
the total number of observations that fall into one of the deﬁned types).
The popularity of each strategy type varies with the treatment and evolves as subjects gain
experience with the environment. However, in all three treatments, the EE strategy loses its popu-
larity to MM and EM strategies as session evolves. Indeed, while EE type strategies are the most
common in all treatments at the beginning of the session, there is a clear decline in their use by
the end of the session especially in the SB and the DBhigh treatments.34 The two other types of
strategies gain popularity as subjects gain experience. In the SB game, by the end of the session
33Formally, let xit represent the share of the budget corresponding to a private allocation to subject i at period t
according to some proposal. We say that proposal at time t splits equally beneﬁts (or that all members are included
in the proposal) if |xit− xjt| ≤ 2.5% for all i, j in the committee. The reason that we allow for small deviations from
the exact equal splits is that the total budget of 200 is not divisible by three.
34The decline in popularity of the EE strategy over time is reminiscent of: 1) In Fréchette et al. (2003) the authors
observe that distributions oﬀering an equal division of payoﬀs decreases in popularity with experience. 2) In VCM
experiments, contributions decline with experience, i.e. outcomes become less eﬃcient over time.
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Figure 1: The evolution of strategies used by subjects in each treatment
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almost 70% of all strategies are of type MM, while in the DB treatments, about one-third of all
proposals are of type MM. Type EM strategies are relatively more popular in the DB treatments,
accounting for 30%-40% of all proposals in the last ﬁve matches.35
5.2 Behavior within each strategy type
Each of the three types of strategies identiﬁed above entails very diﬀerent public investment and
allows, in principle, for heterogeneous behavior within the category. For example, for the MM strat-
egy, inﬁnitely many proposals satisfy the MWC condition in both periods, yet of all such proposals
the bargaining equilibrium identiﬁes one as optimal behavior given imposed restrictions of symme-
try, stationarity and anonymity between periods. Similarly, conditional on using the EE strategy,
optimal behavior involves choosing the eﬃcient level of public investment and distributing the re-
maining funds equally.36 Finally, the EM strategy combines elements of the bargaining equilibrium
and the eﬃcient planner's solution. Thus, conditional on using the EM strategy, optimal behavior
involves choosing public provision at the eﬃcient level in period 1 and following the prescription of
bargaining equilibrium for public provision in period 2.
Given the prevalence of all three types of strategies in our data, the ﬁrst natural question is
whether, conditional on using a particular type of strategy, subjects choose investment levels that
are close to the theoretical ones described above. To address this we calculate the theoretically
optimal proposals within each category and compare it to the observed proposals conditional on the
type of strategy used. The results are presented in Table 7.
Table 7 reveals several interesting patterns. First, investment levels are very diﬀerent between
proposals of diﬀerent types. In particular, subjects using EM or EE type of strategies invest a
signiﬁcantly higher share of resources in the public good in period 1 than those that use MM
strategies. Moreover, within each category, public investment in period 1 preserves a monotonic
relation with respect to the survival rate δ, that is, public provision increases with the survival rate.37
Finally, in SB and DBlow treatments, for each of the three types of strategies, public investments
track closely theoretically optimal levels in both periods.38 On the contrary, in the DBhigh treatment,
we observe under provision of public good in period 1 and over provision of public good in period 2
35The analysis of the transitions between strategies reveals that subjects that play MM strategies in the static
treatment and MM or EM strategies in the DBhigh treatment are very likely to stick with this type of strategy.
Conditional on changing the type of strategy used, the most popular transitions are from EM to MM type of
strategies and from EE to EM type of strategy. The detailed analysis of the transitions between strategies is presented
in Appendix D.
36Notice that the EE strategy cannot be supported as the sub-game perfect equilibrium in a ﬁnite period dynamic
bargaining game, as treating committee members equally in the last period is not optimal.
37Within each category, the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at least at the 5% level in all but two cases. For proposals
of type EE when comparing between the DBlow and the DBhigh treatments and for proposals of type MM when
comparing between SB and the DBlow treatments the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. See Table 39 in
Appendix C for details.
38Even though Table 7 does report statistical diﬀerences between the median and the theoretical predictions in
some cases, quantitatively the diﬀerences are relatively small.
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Table 7: Investment as % of Budget
Treatment
Type MM Type EM Type EE
theory mean median sd theory mean median sd theory mean median sd
Period 1
SB 12.5 12.8 10.0∗∗ 9.1 28.0 27.5 25.0∗∗∗ 11.0 28.0 31.0 25.0∗∗∗ 13.6
DBlow 16.7 17.9 10.0∗∗∗ 20.7 44.0 56.8 50.0 34.9 44.0 49.6 40.0 30.6
DBhigh 44.9 33.2 30.0∗∗∗ 19.6 100 75.5 85.0 28.5 100 70.6 70.0 28.8
Period 2
SB 12.5 11.9 10.0∗∗ 8.6 12.5 12.7 10.0 13.4 28.1 30.5 25.0∗∗∗ 23.6
DBlow 9.2 8.7 0.0∗∗∗ 15.3 9.2 6.8 0.0∗∗∗ 13.0 19.3 32.0∗∗∗ 25.0∗ 29.9
DBhigh 0.0 13.2∗∗∗ 5.0 18.0 0.0 7.4∗∗∗ 0.0 15.7 0.0 44.4∗∗∗ 29.5∗∗∗ 31.5
The table reports the signiﬁcance level of a test using a random eﬀects (quantile) regression where the null hypothesis is that
the mean (median) equals the theory prediction. (See tables 35, 36, 37 and 38 in Appendix C.) Signiﬁcance indicates a
statistical diﬀerence from the prediction: *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
relative to the conditional optimal levels, irrespective of the type of strategy used by the subjects.39
Notice that in the DBhigh treatment in all but one case the conditionally optimal public investment
is a corner solution (the exception is optimal period 1 public provision for MM strategy). Therefore,
any deviations due to mistakes and learning will necessarily be in the direction of underinvesting in
period 1 and over-investing in period 2, which is precisely what our data suggests.
5.3 Payoﬀs for each type of strategy
Table 8 displays information on payoﬀs by treatment, period and strategy type. For each proposal
we compute the payoﬀ for the proposer, for a non-proposer who is in the coalition and for a member
who is not in the coalition, whenever the proposal involves a MWC. The table reports the theoretical
prediction, the mean and the median using data from the last ﬁve matches.
The information on payoﬀs suggests why the popularity of type EE strategies decreases as the
session evolves. Note that period 2 payoﬀs for proposers are lowest for those submitting type EE
strategies, and experiencing low period 2 payoﬀs can disincentivize using this strategy type. Indeed,
Table 30 in Appendix D conﬁrms that a large majority of subjects who are using type EE strategies
by match 6 switch to either of the other two characterized strategy types for the last 4 matches of
the session.
Inspecting payoﬀs also provides a rationale for why both, type MM and type EM strategies,
persist. We do observe some diﬀerences in payoﬀs across these two strategy types: Payoﬀs for type
MM strategies are higher for those in the coalition, while type EM strategies allow for higher period
2 payoﬀs given the relatively higher investment in period 1 (most notably in the DBhigh treatment).
However, diﬀerences between strategies are small if we compute total payoﬀs, adding period 1 and
39Standard deviations reported in Table 7 indicate that there is some heterogeneity between subjects using the same
type of strategy. Figure 6 in the Appendix D provides a closer look at the investment distributions for proposals of
type MM and EM. The SB treatment represents the most accurate case, with the mode of the distribution at around
the theoretical prediction for both MM and EM strategies. In the DB treatments, there is more heterogeneity for
both types of proposals.
25
Table 8: Payoﬀs in tokens (last 5 matches-all submitted proposals)
Type MM Type EM Type EE
theory mean median theory mean median theory mean median
Period 1
SB
Proposer 141.8 113.6∗∗∗ 112.4∗∗∗ 85.4 84.9 85.4 85.4 84.9 85.4
Non Proposer 83.2 108.4∗∗∗ 111.5∗∗∗ 85.4 84.9 85.4 85.4 84.9 85.4
Not in Coalition 25.0 23.9 22.4
DBlow
Proposer 140.1 106.1∗∗∗ 108.7∗∗∗ 84.3 80.1∗∗ 83.1 84.3 80.3∗ 82.4∗
Non Proposer 84.5 104.8∗∗∗ 105.8∗∗∗ 84.3 79.6∗ 82.4 84.3 80.2∗ 82.4∗
Not in Coalition 25.0 24.7 22.4
DBhigh
Proposer 121.0 106.2∗∗∗ 108.7∗∗∗ 70.7 77.3∗∗∗ 75.2∗∗∗ 70.7 76.6∗∗∗ 75.2∗∗∗
Non Proposer 84.2 104.5∗∗∗ 106.5∗∗∗ 70.7 76.9∗∗∗ 75.2∗∗∗ 70.7 76.6∗∗∗ 75.2∗∗∗
Not in Coalition 47.4 36.4∗∗ 35.4∗∗∗
Period 2
SB
Proposer 141.8 114.1∗∗∗ 112.4∗∗∗ 141.8 109.4∗∗∗ 111.7∗∗∗ 85.4 84.5 85.4
Non Proposer 83.2 107.6∗∗∗ 109.4∗∗∗ 83.2 108.1∗∗∗ 111.6∗∗∗ 85.4 84.5 85.4
Not in Coalition 25.0 22.8 22.4 25.0 19.4∗∗ 22.4
DBlow
Proposer 145.2 114.0∗∗∗ 114.9∗∗∗ 150.2 116.1∗∗∗ 114.9∗∗∗ 91.3 88.8∗∗ 88.5∗∗
Non Proposer 85.6 112.7∗∗∗ 113.5∗∗∗ 90.6 115.4∗∗∗ 114.9∗∗∗ 91.3 88.6∗∗ 88.5∗∗
Not in Coalition 25.0 22.7∗ 22.4 30.0 25.1∗ 22.9∗∗∗
DBhigh
Proposer 175.8 140.0∗∗∗ 137.4∗∗∗ 196.4 148.0∗∗∗ 152.9∗∗∗ 129.8 106.6∗∗∗ 104.0∗∗∗
Non Proposer 109.0 138.1∗∗∗ 136.6∗∗∗ 129.8 147.1∗∗∗ 149.9∗∗∗ 129.8 106.2∗∗∗ 103.9∗∗∗
Not in Coalition 42.4 45.6∗ 44.7 63.2 53.5∗∗∗ 58.3∗∗
Exchange rate: 10 tokens = $1.
The table reports the signiﬁcance level of a test using a random eﬀects (quantile) regression where the null hypothesis is that
the mean (median) equals the theory prediction. Signiﬁcance indicates a statistical diﬀerence from the prediction: *Signiﬁcant
at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
period 2. Consider the DBhigh treatment. The payoﬀ of a type MM strategy is 190 tokens (before
the identity of the proposer is revealed), which is only slightly below the 193 tokens corresponding to
a type EM. Thus, for the two strategy types that corresponds to most of our data in later matches,
the diﬀerence in payoﬀs is relatively small.40 This suggests that the choice between type MM and
type EM strategies is not based on a diﬀerence in payoﬀs. In the next section we explore a rationale
for selecting type EM strategies.
5.4 A rationale for type EM strategies
To illustrate the rationale, consider an EM strategy that involves public investment at the planner's
level in period 1 and dividing equally the remainder. In period 2 the proposer behaves just as in
the bargaining equilibrium (forms a MWC and invests in the public good optimally given period
1 investment) except for the choice of the coalition partners. If period 1's proposer provided an
40In Table 32 of Appendix D we explore this comparison further.
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amount of public good at the eﬃcient level, then the proposer in period 2 invites period 1's proposer
into the coalition in period 2. Otherwise, the period 2 proposer punishes period 1's proposer by
excluding her from the coalition in period 2. Such a strategy can be implemented in our experiment,
since the ID numbers of the committee members remain the same within a match. Theoretically,
however, such a strategy cannot be supported as a sub-game perfect equilibrium, since the rewards
and punishments are not credible. In the period 2 subgame, after a period 1 proposer deviated
from cooperation (eﬃcient investment in period 1), any other committee member should exclude
her from the coalition. Because she is not included in coalitions proposed by others, the punished
agent's continuation value is the lowest of all agents. Thus, any proposer is tempted to deviate, pay
her less than the alternative, and include her in the coalition.
To see whether the described punishments/rewards mechanism is consistent with the behavior of
subjects that opted to use the EM strategy, we focus on period 2 proposals from subjects who were
not proposers in period 1. Let xP12 be the private allocation in period 2 to a subject who was the
proposer in period 1 (P1). The dummy variable A1 takes value 1 if the period 1 proposer proposed an
allocation that beneﬁts equally all three members and 0 otherwise. A period 2 proposer that uses the
EM strategy punishes the period 1 proposer by allocating her xP12 = 0 whenever A1 = 0 and rewards
her by xP12 > 0 whenever A1 = 1. Therefore, we would expect E(x
P1
2 |A1 = 0) < E(xP12 |A1 = 1).
In constrast, we would expect to observe no such diﬀerence for other types. We will test for this
hypothesis by estimating for each treatment:
xP12 = α0 + α1 ·A1 + α2 · EMstrategy + α3 · (A1× EMstrategy) + ,
where  ∼ N(0, σ) and EMstrategy is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the proposal involving
xP12 is of Type EM (as deﬁned in Section 5.1). We estimate a random eﬀects regression for each
treatment separately and report in Table 9 the average private allocations to period 1 proposers
depending on their period 1 behavior (A1) and the type of the proposal in period 2.41 Notice that
for proposals that are not of EM type (EMstrategy = 0) there is no quantitative diﬀerence between
proposers who cooperated (A1=1) and those who did not (A1 = 0). The diﬀerence is dictated
by the estimates of α2, which are not signiﬁcant for DB treatments and, although signiﬁcant, it is
relatively small in the SB case. This is no longer the case for Type EM proposals. Diﬀerences are
signiﬁcant in the DB treatments, but of similar magnitude in all cases, between 10% and 15% of
the budget approximately.
The previous evidence shows that subjects using EM strategies oﬀer lower payoﬀs to period 1
proposers who deviated from cooperation, but they still oﬀer a positive amount on average while
the theory predicts a payoﬀ of zero. To inspect this further Figure 2 presents the distribution of xP12
for DB treatments. Consider the top left graphs summarizing the information for EM strategies in
the DBlow treatment. When the proposer did not cooperate in period 1 (A1 = 0) the mode involves
zero private allocations. In contrast, when the proposer cooperated in period 1 (A1 = 1), there is
41The estimated coeﬃcients from equation above are reported in Table 33 of Appendix D.
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Table 9: Punishments: Private allocation to period 1 proposer (xP12 )
Strategy type Period 1 Proposer SB DBlow DBhigh
EMstrategy = 1
A1 = 1 21.66 27.78 29.05
A1 = 0 14.14 10.45 19.55
EMstrategy = 0
A1 = 1 23.10 21.31 19.70
A1 = 0 20.50 19.52 22.29
a large mass with positive private allocations. The same qualitative ﬁnding holds for EM proposals
in the DBhigh treatment. This pattern is no longer observed if we focus on MM proposals in both
dynamic treatments (second row). The mass of zero oﬀers does not show signiﬁcant diﬀerences
depending on the behavior of period 1's proposer (A1 = 0 versus A1 = 1).
6 Conclusion
When there are dynamic linkages in the inter-temporal provision of a durable public good the usual
static ineﬃciencies are present, but new dynamic ineﬃciencies arise. Since introducing a dynamic
link in a model is typically more theoretically demanding, a prominent question is whether such
ineﬃciencies are empirically meaningful. In this paper, we design an experiment that can isolate
static and dynamic ineﬃciencies in a two-period laboratory environment, and report the ﬁndings of
that experiment.
When the theory predicts dynamic ineﬃciencies to be large, the data are in line with the pre-
diction. Our data indicate that subjects respond to the incentives in the environment in similar
ways to earlier experiments on legislative bargaining. With experience, bargaining delays become
infrequent and minimum winning coalition proposals become more prevalent. The main focus of our
analysis is on period 1 investment behavior, because that is key to identifying dynamic ineﬃciencies
and measuring the extent to which they aﬀect outcomes. On average, investment in the ﬁrst period
is highest when the proportion of period 1 investment that survives in period 2 is high, i.e, the
depreciation rate of the durable public good is low. Moreover, period 1 investment is monotonically
lower as the depreciation rate increases. Accordingly, when dynamic linkages are relatively low,
dynamic ineﬃciencies become less important, as predicted by the theory. Furthermore, we identify
two sources of dynamic ineﬃciencies, the durability eﬀect and the crowding-out eﬀect, and estimate
their magnitudes. Our data indicates that, consistent with the theory predictions, the durability
eﬀect is signiﬁcantly larger than the crowding-out eﬀect; however, the magnitudes of both eﬀects
are lower than predicted by theory. Overall our data indicates that dynamic ineﬃciencies can be
empirically quite large, especially when depreciation rates are low.
We also document heterogeneity in individual behavior. Some subjects propose investment levels
that are close to the planner's in both periods, especially in early matches. While those subjects may
be driven by altruism, the prevalence of this behavior is substantially reduced as the session evolves.
In later matches we are able to identify two canonical types of behavior that capture most of the
data. First, a large proportion of subjects use strategies that involve minimum winning coalitions
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and display investment levels that are, on average, close to the theoretical predictions. The second
prevalent behavior involves strategic cooperation. These are subjects whose proposals in the ﬁrst
period are signiﬁcantly higher than the theoretical level, and then use a minimum winning coalition
in period 2 to reward/punish period 1 choices. According to such behavior, if the investment level
proposed in period 1 was eﬃcient (or nearly eﬃcient), then the committee member who made
that proposal would be invited into the coalition in period 2 and excluded otherwise. While this
behavior is not sub-game perfect, average payoﬀs are quite close to those who always proposed
a minimum winning coalition. This behavior is suggestive that a non non-negligible fraction of
subjects condition period 2 behavior on period 1 outcomes.
We close with two comments about the two-period approach we use to study dynamic free riding.
First, while much of the theory about the dynamic provision of durable public goods has been studied
using inﬁnite horizon models, the basic phenomenon of dynamic free riding appears even in simple
ﬁnite horizon models with two periods of public good accumulation. This allows for much simpler
experimental designs, compared with experiments that are designed to mimic an inﬁnite horizon
using random termination rules. Methodologically, it allows for a more straightforward analysis of
the data, which always appear in blocks of two periods, rather than the data from experiments
with random termination rules, where diﬀerent observations have diﬀerent numbers of periods. On
the other hand, the two period models lack the elegance of the inﬁnite horizon models and cannot
address deeper theoretical issues about convergence to stationary states (public good levels) and
Markov equilibrium. The philosophy behind our design is that this tradeoﬀ probably favors the
two-period model if the goal of the experiment is to compare treatments aimed at sorting out and
identifying static and dynamic free riding eﬀects. In other contexts, where the goal is to evaluate
outcomes relative the predicted long run steady states or to test for Markov equilibrium, the tradeoﬀ
tilts the other way, and there are several examples of this. See, for example Battaglini and Palfrey
(2012), Battaglini et al. (2012), Vespa (2015), and Battaglini et al. (2013).
Second, there are other dynamic environments that have been modeled theoretically using in-
ﬁnite horizon stochastic games, which may also merit study in the laboratory using a two-period
approach. An example of this is the experimental study Battaglini et al. (2014) of a simple two
period version of the Battaglini-Coate inﬁnite horizon model of the political economy of debt and
public good provision Battaglini and Coate (2008).
The study of dynamic games in the lab is still relatively new. Although questions having to do
with public goods or legislative bargaining have a long history in experimental economics, how this
knowledge can be translated to dynamic environments is not self-evident. We think that a richer
and more nuanced understanding of the impact of dynamic linkages on these environments can be
obtained by both studying inﬁnitely repeated games as well as simpler games that allow to better
focus on certain features of the dynamic environment. In the context of legislative bargaining with
durable public goods we show that indeed subjects react to the tensions identiﬁed by the model,
in particular both the force of static and dynamic free-ridding. However, we also ﬁnd that many
subjects deviate from the equilibrium strategy in favor of an eﬃcient strategy with an easy to
30
implement punishment.
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Appendix A: Proofs
The Eﬃcient Solution
The maximization problem speciﬁed in section 2.1 can be re-written as
max
IP1 ,I
P
2
[
B1 − IP1 + n · u
(
IP1
)
+B2 − IP2 + n · u
(
δIP1 + I
P
2
)]
s.t. 0 ≤ IP1 ≤ B1 and 0 ≤ IP2 ≤ B2
There are several cases to deal with depending on which, if any, constraints are binding. If no
constraints are binding, then there is an interior solution, (IP
∗
1 , I
P ∗
2 ) characterized by two ﬁrst order
conditions:
u′(δIP
∗
1 + I
P ∗
2 ) =
1
n
(1)
u′(IP
∗
1 ) +
δ
n
=
1
n
If the solution is not interior, there are several ways the constraints can be binding. One
possibility is that IP1 ≤ B1 is binding. A second possibility is that 0 ≤ IP2 is binding. A third
possibility is that IP2 ≤ B2 binds, but this is an uninteresting case and in the rest of the paper we
assume it never binds. Notice that the constraint 0 ≤ IP1 is never binding because of the Inada
condition on u. The constraint 0 ≤ IP2 is binding when the value of IP
∗
1 that solves (1) is such that
u′(δIP ∗1 ) <
1
n , which happens if δ is suﬃciently large. In this case, as long as I
P
1 ≤ B1 is not also
binding, the solution is given by:
u′(IP
∗
1 ) + δu
′(δIP
∗
1 ) =
1
n
(2)
the second equation of (1), with IP
∗
2 = 0. If both I
P
1 ≤ B1 and 0 ≤ IP2 bind, then the solution is
IP
∗
1 = B1, I
P ∗
2 = 0. If only I
P
1 ≤ B1 is binding, then the solution is given by the ﬁrst equation of
(1), with IP
∗
1 = B1. Finally, observe that our assumptions on u implies a unique planner solution
(IP
∗
1 , I
P ∗
2 ).
In our experiments, the utility of the public good is given by u(g) = Agα and parameters B1
and B2 are large enough so that the budget constraints are not binding. Thus, the eﬃcient solution
depends on the value of δ:
if δ1−α < 1− δ then

IP
∗
1 =
[
1− δ
nAα
] 1
α−1
IP
∗
2 =
[
1
nAα
] 1
α−1
− δ
[
1− δ
nAα
] 1
α−1
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if δ1−α ≥ 1− δ then
 I
P ∗
1 =
[
1
nAα(1 + δα)
] 1
α−1
IP
∗
2 = 0
The Bargaining Equilibrium
Period 2
The randomly chosen proposer only needs to gain the support of n−12 other members of the commit-
tee. Denote by xPr2 the private allocation the proposer will keep for herself and by x
C
2 the amount
she will give to n−12 non-proposer committee members `in her coalition'. Then, her maximization
problem is given by:
max
(xPr2 ,xC2 ,IL2 )
[
xPr2 + u(g2)
]
s.t.

xPr2 +
n−1
2 · xC2 + IL2 ≤ B2
xC2 + u(g2) ≥ V2(I1)
0 ≤ IL2 , 0 ≤ xPr2 , 0 ≤ xC2
g2 = δI
L
1 + I
L
2
where IL1 is the level of public good implemented in period 1 of the legislative bargaining game,
V2(I
L
1 ) is the value of the game in the second period, as a function of I
L
1 , before a proposer has
been selected. The ﬁrst constraint involves re-writing the budget constraint using the symmetry
assumption. In other words, the private allocation for the proposer plus an equal amount assigned
to each other member of a minimum winning coalition (MWC) cannot be higher than the available
funds after investment (B2−IL2 ), where subscript L stands for the legislature. The second constraint
guarantees the participation of other coalition members. A non-proposer who is included in the
coalition will vote in favor of the proposal if the utility he gets from it (LHS) is at least as high
as the equilibrium expected value of rejecting it (V2). The remaining constraints are feasibility
constraints. Being a strictly concave problem, there will be a unique solution for the equilibrium
period 2 investment level, IL2 . Assuming an interior solution, 0 ≤ IL2 ≤ B2, it is characterized by:
u′(δIL1 + I
L
2 ) =
2
n+ 1
(3)
In period 2, the proposer weighs the marginal beneﬁt to the public good to the coalition of n+12
voters against the marginal cost in units of private good of investing an extra unit in the public
good.
FOC (3) captures the optimal period 2 investment in the bargaining game as a function of the
investment in the ﬁrst period, I1. As in the analysis of the planner's solution, it is possible that
u′(δIL1 ) <
2
n+1 , in which case (3) violates the constraint 0 ≤ IL2 . Thus, the full characterization of
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how IL2 varies as a function of I
L
1 is the following:
IL2 (I
L
1 ) =

u′−1
[
2
n+ 1
]
− δIL1 if u′(δIL1 ) ≥
2
n+ 1
0 otherwise
The funds remaining once the unique optimal investment level has been determined are simply
B2 − IL2 (IL1 ). These remaining funds will be allocated among committee members just as in a
Baron-Ferejohn multilateral bargaining game with no public good, giving:
xC2 =
1
n
(
B2 − IL2 (I1)
)
xPr2 =
n+ 1
2n
(
B2 − IL2 (I1)
)
Finally, we can also use the equilibrium levels of these allocations to compute the equilibrium
continuation value in period 2, V2(I1):
V2(I
L
1 ) =
1
n
(
B2 − IL2 (IL1 )
)
+ u(δIL1 + I
L
2 (I1)) (4)
Period 1
The selected period 1 proposer anticipates how her decisions will impact choices in period 2. The
maximization problem of the proposer in period 1 can be written as:
max
(xPr1 ,xC1 ,IL1 )
[
xPr1 + u(I
L
1 ) + V2(I
L
1 )
]
s.t.

xPr1 +
n−1
2 x
C
1 + I
L
1 ≤ B1
xC1 + u(I
L
1 ) + V2(I
L
1 ) ≥ V1
0 ≤ IL1 ≤ B1, 0 ≤ xPr1 , 0 ≤ xC1
.
where V1 is the expected value of the game to each player before a proposer has been selected. The
function to maximize includes the proposer's period 1 utility and the equilibrium expected value of
the game for period 2, which depends on IL1 . Maximization is constrained by the budget and by the
fact that any coalition member expects the proposal to provide at least as much as he would receive
by rejecting it (V1). The ﬁrst constraint obviously holds with equality. If the second constraint
is binding and the feasibility constraints are not binding (i.e., the solution is interior), then the
maximization problem for the proposer in period 1 can be rewritten as:
max
IL1
[
B1 − IL1 −
n− 1
2
V1 +
n+ 1
2
[
u(IL1 ) + V2(I
L
1 )
]]
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The ﬁrst order condition that characterizes the equilibrium investment in period 1, IL1 is:
u′(IL1 ) +
dV2
dI1
|IL1 =
2
n+ 1
(5)
The left hand side again reﬂects the distortions from the planner's solution due to a combination
of free rider eﬀects (both dynamic and static) and the bargaining advantage of the period 1 proposer.
There are two separate dynamic eﬀects, because IL1 aﬀects V2 in two ways: there is a direct eﬀect
on the level of public good in period 2, which we refer to as the durability eﬀect; second, there is
an indirect eﬀect on the equilibrium private allocations in period 2, which we call the crowding-out
eﬀect.
dV2
dI1
|IL1 = −
1
n
dIL2
dI1
|IL1 +
[
δ +
dIL2
dI1
|IL1
]
u′
[
δIL1 + I
L
2 (I
L
1 )
]
(6)
Case 1: Interior solution. At an interior solution (i.e., IL1 < B1 and I
L
2 (I
L
1 ) > 0),
dI2
dI1
= −δ, so
the ﬁrst term reduces to δn , and the second term vanishes because the increased period 1 investment
completely crowds out period 2 investment. Hence in this case, the entire dynamic free riding eﬀect
is due to the indirect crowding-out eﬀect, that is, dV2dI1 |IL1 =
δ
n . Substituting back into the ﬁrst order
condition for the equilibrium period 1 proposal, 5, gives:
u′(IL1 ) +
δ
n
=
2
n+ 1
(7)
Thus, the crowding out eﬀect actually reduces the free rider problem, since the (interior) value
of IL1 that solves (7) is strictly higher than the solution if δ = 0, and is actually increasing in δ.
The intuition behind this is that the period 1 proposer can reduce the side payments to coalition
members by increasing V2 (by freeing up more period 2 budget for private allocations), and raises
her own payoﬀ at the same time.
Case 2: Corner solution, IL2 (I
L
1 ) = 0. If in equilibrium the constraint 0 ≤ I2 binds, then
dI2
dI1
= 0, and the ﬁrst term vanishes. In this case, investment in period 1 will not substitute for
investment in period 2 at the margin. Hence in this case, the entire dynamic free riding eﬀect is
due to the direct durability eﬀect. That is, dV2dI1 |IL1 = δu
′(δI1). Substituting back into the ﬁrst order
condition for the equilibrium period 1 proposal, 5, gives:
u′(IL1 ) + δu
′(δIL1 ) =
2
n+ 1
(8)
Given functional form used in our experiments u(g) = Agα, the equilibrium investment levels in
the legislative bargaining game are given by:
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if δ1−α < 1− δn+ 1
2n
then

IL
∗
1 =
[
1− n+12n δ
n+1
2 Aα
] 1
α−1
IL
∗
2 =
[
1
n+1
2 Aα
] 1
α−1
− δ
[
1− n+12n δ
n+1
2 Aα
] 1
α−1
if δ1−α ≥ 1− δn+ 1
2n
then

IL
∗
1 =
[
1
n+1
2 Aα(1 + δ
α)
] 1
α−1
IL
∗
2 = 0
Finally, we note that it is straightforward generalizes analysis presented here to any quota voting
rule, where a proposal passes if a winning coalition requires at least q individuals, where q is any
integer from 1 to n. The main idea is that the free riding problem is linked directly the fact that a
proposer will only internalize the value to q members of the legislature, since that is all she needs for
the proposal to pass. When q = n, there is no free rider problem, and the optimal public investment
is the equilibrium investment.
Appendix B: Instructions
Below we present the instructions for DBhigh treatment. Periods are referred to as Rounds.
Written instructions
Welcome
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision making and you will be paid for your
participation with cash vouchers, privately at the end of the session. The currency in this experi-
ment is called tokens. All payoﬀs are denominated in this currency. Tokens that you earn in the
experiment will be converted into US dollars using the rate 10 Tokens = $1. In addition, you will
get $10 participation fee if you complete the experiment. The money you earn will depend on your
decisions, the decisions of others and chance.
Do not talk to or attempt to communicate with other participants during the session. Please
make sure to turn oﬀ phones, mp3 players and pagers now. The session will begin with a brief
instructional period, during which you will be informed of the main features of the task and you
will be shown how to use the computer.
Basic Steps
In this experiment you will act as voters that distribute funds between yourself and others in a
series of matches. Each match consists of two rounds. In each round you must decide on how to
split a sum of money between yourself, two others and a group project. Proposals will be voted up
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or down (accepted or rejected) by majority rule; i.e., for proposals to pass they must get 2 or more
votes.
Each match starts with round 1. Your three-member group will have to decide how to divide
200 tokens. To do this each member of the group will submit a proposal that speciﬁes how the 200
tokens are divided between you, the two other voters and the group project.
After you have all made your proposals, one of them will be selected at random to be voted on.
All proposals have equal probability of being selected. The proposed allocation will be posted on
your computer screens and you will have to decide whether to accept or reject it.
• If the proposed allocation passes (gets 2 or more votes)  it is binding and you move on to
the round 2.
• If the proposal is defeated (gets less than 2 votes), there will be a call for new proposals. This
process will repeat itself until a proposed allocation passes (gets 2 or more votes).
In round 2, the group will again have to allocate 200 tokens between you, two other voters and the
group project. The process is the same: each member of the group starts by submitting a proposal.
The diﬀerence with the previous round is that part of what the group allocated to the group
project in round 1 is still available in round 2. In other words, the project size at the beginning of
round 2 is 80% of the amount invested in the group project in round 1. For example, if the group
project that passed in round 1 was 15 tokens, then the project size at the beginning of round 2 is
12 tokens. The total project size at the end of round 2 will be the project size at the beginning of
round 2 (which is 12 tokens in our example) plus the investment in the group project in round 2.
After you have all made your proposals, one of the proposed allocations will be selected at
random to be voted on and you will have to decide whether to accept or reject it.
• If the proposed allocation passes (gets 2 or more votes)  it is binding and you move on to
round 1 in a new Match.
• If the proposal is defeated (gets less than 2 votes), there will be a call for new proposals and
the process will repeat itself until a proposed allocation passes (gets 2 or more votes).
Payoﬀs
Your Payoﬀ in round 1 depends only on the proposed allocation that passed:
Your Your
Payoﬀ = Individual Allocation +5×
in round 1 in round 1
 Investmentin Group Project
in round 1

0.5
Your Payoﬀ in round 2 depends on the proposed allocation that passed and on the size of the
group project at the beginning of round 2.
Your Your
Payoﬀ = Individual Allocation +5×
in round 2 in round 2
 Project Size at the beginning of round 2+
Investment in Group Project in round 2

0.5
When you are considering what proposal to submit, the computer interface will let you compute
the payoﬀs implied by your proposal for each voter of the group.
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Number of matches
In this session there will be total of 10 matches with two rounds in each match. Before the beginning
of each match, participants in the experiment will be divided randomly to the groups of 3 voters.
The identity of your group members will never be revealed to you and your group members will
never know your identity. You will stay in the same group in both rounds of a match. Once the
second round of the match is over, you will be randomly allocated to a new group of 3 voters.
How tokens are converted into cash payments
At the conclusion of the experiment, one of the 10 matches played for tokens will be randomly
selected by computer, and the tokens you earned in this match (both in the ﬁrst and in the second
round) will be converted into US dollars using a conversion rate of 10 Tokens = $1. In addition you
will receive the $8 participation fee for completing the experiment.
To summarize
• The experiment consists of 10 matches. In each match participants are assigned to groups of
3 voters in each. Each match consists of two rounds.
• In each round all members of the group submit a proposal to allocate 200 tokens between a
group project and individual allocations to each of the 3 voters. One of these proposals is
selected at random and is voted on by all group members. All proposals have equal chance of
being selected.
• Tokens allocated to the group project yield positive payoﬀs for all group members, while
tokens allocated to the individual members of the group beneﬁt only those members.
• The allocation passes if two or more voters accept it. If the allocation passes in round 1, the
group moves on to round 2.
• If the allocation passes in round 2, a new match will begin. If the allocation is rejected, then
there will be a call for new proposals.
• Your payoﬀ in round 1 depends on your individual allocation in round 1 and the group
investment in round 1.
• The project size at the beginning of round 2 is 80% of the investment in the Group Project
in round 1.
• Your payoﬀ in round 2 depends on your individual allocation in round 2, the investment in
the Group Project in round 2 and the size of the Group Project at the beginning of round 2.
• Total payoﬀ in the match = Payoﬀ in round 1 + Payoﬀ in round 2.
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• Once the match is over, participants are randomly assigned to new groups of 3 voters in each
and the next match begins, which is identical to the previous one.
• At the end of the experiment, one match is chosen randomly by the computer, and the tokens
earned in this match are converted into US dollars, added to the participation fee and paid
to participants in cash vouchers.
Diﬀerence in Instructions for Static and Dynamic treatments
The diﬀerence between instructions in the SB treatment and presented above DBhigh treatment was
the part describing that some portion of the public investment from round 1 survives to round 2 in
the DBhigh treatment, while it is not in the SB treatment. In particular, in the SB treatment the
instructions did not contain the paragraph The diﬀerence with the previous round is that part of
what the group allocated to the group project in round 1 is still available in round 2."
In addition, payoﬀs for round 2 were described as follows:
Your Payoﬀ in round 2 also depends only on the proposed allocation that passed:
Your Your
Payoﬀ = Individual Allocation +5×
in round 2 in round 2
 Investmentin Group Project
in round 2

0.5
Script and Slides
This script was read aloud while projecting some slides. See Figure 3 to follow most instructions.
Comments between brackets were not read aloud.
Script
We will now conduct a practice round that will not count for money. As we move on this practice
round please do not click or enter any information until I ask you to. If you have any questions
raise your hand.
The experiment will take place over a sequence of 10 matches. We begin the match by dividing
you into committees of three members each. Each of you is assigned to exactly one of these com-
mittees. In each match your committee will make budget decisions by majority over a sequence of
two rounds.
[SHOW SLIDE A1+A2+A3+P=200]
[point while reading] In each round your committee has a budget of 200. Your committee must
decide how to divide this budget into four categories, in integer amounts: the ﬁrst three categories
are the private allocations and they always have to be greater than or equal to 0. The fourth
category is for investment in a project and it also must be greater than or equal to 0.
If your committee's budget decision is (A1, A2, A3, P), then A1 go directly to member 1's
earnings, A2 to member 2 and A3 to member 3. The project investment produces earnings for all
committee members in the following way.
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The project earnings in a round depend on the size of the project at the end of that round.
Speciﬁcally, each committee member earns an amount in points proportional to the square root of
the size of the project at the end of the round (precisely equal to 5*sqrt(project size) ). During
the experiment, there will be a graph on the screen that shows exactly how project earnings will
depend on project size.
[SHOW SLIDE GRAPH]
For example, if the size of the project at the end of the round equals 121, then each member
earns exactly 5*sqrt(121) or 55 additional points in that round. If the size is equal to 25, each
member earns exactly 5*sqrt(25) or 25 additional points in that round. In your display, earnings
are always rounded to two decimal places. So, for example if the project size at the end of a round
equals 70, each member earns 41.83 points from the project in that round.
As we said before, there are two rounds. The project size at the end of round 1 is simply what
the committee allocated to the project in round 1. 80% of the amount invested in the project in
round 1 carries over to round 2, so project size at the beginning of round 2 is 80% of project size in
round 1. Finally project size at the end of round 2 is the project size at the beginning of round 2
plus the investment in the project in round 2.
At the end of each round your earnings for that round are computed by adding the project
earnings to your private allocation. For example, if your private allocation is 20 and the end-of-
round project size is 121, then your earnings for that round equal 20 + 5*sqrt(121) = 20+5*11 =
75. Your earnings for the match equal the sum of the earnings in both rounds of that match.
After the ﬁrst match ends, we move to match 2. In this new match, you are reshued randomly
into new committees of three members each. The match then proceeds the same way as match 1.
We will now go through one practice match very slowly. During the practice match, please do
not hit any keys until I tell you, and when you are prompted by the computer to enter information,
please wait for me to tell you exactly what to enter. You are not paid for this practice match.
[AUTHENTICATE CLIENTS-Start Multistage]
Please double click on the icon on your desktop that says BP2. When the computer prompts
you for your name, type your First and Last name. Then click SUBMIT and wait for further
instructions.
[accept and start game] [screenshot]
You now see the ﬁrst screen of the experiment on your computer. It should look similar to this
screen. [POINT]
You have been assigned by the computer to a committee of three subjects, and assigned a
committee member number: 1, 2 or 3. This committee assignment and your member number stay
the same for both rounds of this match, but will change across matches. It is very important that
you take careful note of your committee member number.
Your committee decides on a budget for this round by the following voting procedure. First,
every member is asked to type in a provisional budget proposal, consisting of four integers, A1, A2,
A3 and P, which add up to 200. A1, A2, A3 and P have to be greater than or equal to 0.
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Ok. In the example. . . committee member # individual allocations should be entered here
project investment here. As we proceed note that any information pertaining to you speciﬁcally
will be in red.
[point to graph as appropriate, while reading this]
As a visual aid, there is a graph on the left that shows exactly how project earnings will depend
on project size. The current size of the project is marked with a large dot. If your committee decides
to invest nothing this period, then this will be the size that determines your project earnings at the
end of the round. You can use your mouse to move the cursor along the curve to ﬁgure out what
your earnings will be for diﬀerent levels of investment. Also, if you type in a budget amount in the
Project box, the computer will compute and display the corresponding project earnings for you just
below the box.
Take a minute to practice using your cursor to move along the curve, and typing in diﬀerent
possible investment levels for the Project. But do not hit the conﬁrm button yet.
[wait one minute]
At this time, go ahead and type in any provisional proposal you wish and hit the conﬁrm button.
You are not paid for this practice match so it does not matter what you enter.
[wait for responses] [screenshot]
After everyone in your committee has submitted a provisional budget proposal, your screen
should now look similar to this one [POINT]. The computer has randomly selected one of the
provisional budget proposal submitted by the members of your committee to be the Round One
Proposed Budget in your committee. In the top-right of your screen you are shown this proposed
budget as well as which committee member made this proposal. [POINT]
[ In this example Again: member Number Current project size Proposer Proposed budget. These
numbers are random Note that when information is displayed in a quadruple, it is always listed in
order of memberNumber. So. . . Also note : I am member 3, so the number is red.] At this moment
all committee members are asked to vote on the Proposed Budget. The decision is made by majority
rule. The Proposed Budget passes if it receives 2 or 3 votes. Otherwise, it fails, there will be a
call for new proposals and the process will repeat itself until a proposed budget passes (gets 2 or 3
votes). To vote to accept the Proposed Budget, click on the yes button; to reject it, click on the
no button. Please go ahead and vote yes now. Since this is a practice round that doesn't count
for money please all click on yes button.
[wait for responses] [screenshot]
[point] In addition to your committee member number, you can see each member's vote, the
outcome of the vote, and the end of round project size. You can also see your earnings in round 1
and the project size in the beginning of round 2.
[In this example Again, in order: memberNumber Votes Outcome End-Of-Round project size]
This marks the end of the round.
The table with columns in the bottom of your screen is the History panel and summarizes all
of this important information.
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[Go BRIEFLY over history panel]
[click to advance to next round] [screenshot]
Now the second round begins. In this second round, you keep the same committee member
number as in the ﬁrst round, and the members of your committee all stay the same. Notice that
80% of the project investment from round 1 carries over, so the round 2 beginning project size
equals 0.8 times the project size at the end of round 1.
[In this example Project size upper right hand corner Project size at origin of graph]
In this second round each member of the committee is asked to submit Provisional Budget Pro-
posal of how to divide 200 between yourself, two other committee members and project investment.
Please enter your Provisional Budget Proposal now.
[screenshot]
One of the proposals was randomly chosen to be voted on. [In this example proposal]
On the graph, you can see the project size if this proposal will pass. At this time all committee
members are asked to vote on the chosen budget proposal. If two or three members of the committee
vote yes, then the proposal will pass and this will be the end of the match. If the proposal will fail
then there will be a call for new proposals and the process repeats itself until the proposal is passed.
You can now ﬁnish this round, by voting yes on the budget proposal.
[screenshot] [wait for them to ﬁnish]
Finally on this screen you see the proposal that passed and your earnings for this round.
Now we are ready for the comprehension quiz. Everyone must answer all the questions correctly
before we go to the paid matches. The quiz has four pages. You must answer all the questions on
Page 1 of the quiz to proceed to Page 2, and you must answer all the questions on Page 2 of the
quiz to proceed to Page 3, etc. . . . If you answer any of the questions on a page incorrectly, you will
be asked to try again. Please raise your hand if you have any questions during the quiz, and we will
come to your desk and answer your question in private.
[reassure them its ok to ask for help]
[Quiz detailed below]
[WAIT FOR END OF QUIZ]
Are there any questions before we begin with the paid session?
[WAIT FOR QUESTIONS]
We will now begin with the ﬁrst of 10 paid matches of the experiment. If there are any problems
or questions from this point on, raise your hand and an experimenter will come and assist you in
private.
Quiz
Handout in the instructions
[Not read: Extra handout to subjects that the experimenter reads with the subjects]
Before we start with the experiment we ask you to answer a few questions related to the in-
structions. You can make up to $4 if you answer these questions correctly. The table below is
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provided to familiarize you with the payoﬀs and help you when you answer the questions. The ﬁrst
column shows possible allocations to the Group Project in round 1 from 200 to 0 with changes of 10
tokens. The second column displays how the investment in the group project will be transformed
into tokens for payoﬀs. The third column shows what will be available for individual allocations in
round 1. The fourth column shows the part of the round 1 Investment in the Group Project that
will be available in round 2: The Size of the Project at the beginning of round 2. The last column
displays the portion of round 2 payoﬀs that comes from the Project Size at the beginning of round
2.
Questions as they appear on the screens
Screen 1
1. For a budget proposal, what do your Private Investments and Project Investment have to add
up to? a) 50; b)100; c)200; d) 250
2. There are two rounds in each match. a) True; b) False. There are ten rounds in each match.
c)False. The number of rounds in each match depends on the roll of the die.
3. Your committee member number stays the same throughout the experiment. a) True; b)
False. Your committee member number stays the same in every round of a match, but is
reassigned for new matches.
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4. You are reshued into a diﬀerent committee for each match. a) True; b) False. You are in
the same committee in all matches.
Screen 2
1. In round 1, assume that in the allocation supported by a majority of committee members the
Project Investment is 30 and your individual allocation is 20. How much of your payoﬀ would
come from the Project Investment? a) 50; b) 38.73; c) 27.39; d) 65.19
2. How much of your payoﬀ would come from the individual allocation? a) 30; b) 100; c) 20; d)
170
3. What size is the Project Investment at the beginning of round 2? a) 48; b) 24; c) 72; d) 112
4. How much of your payoﬀ in round 2 would come from the Project Investment in round 1? a)
112.25; b) 24.49; c) 58.31; d) 15.81; e) 20
Screen 3
1. In round 1, assume that in the allocation supported by a majority of committee members
the Project Investment is 100 and your individual allocation is 20. How much of your payoﬀ
would come from the Project Investment? a) 50; b) 38.73; c) 57.01; d) 65.19
2. How much of your payoﬀ would come from the individual allocation? a) 30; b) 100; c) 20; d)
170
3. What size is the Project Investment at the beginning of round 2? a) 72; b) 88; c) 80; d) 40
4. How much of your payoﬀ in round 2 would come from the Project Investment in round 1? a)
44.72; b) 25.50; c) 50.99; d) 22.36
Screen 4
1. In round 1, assume that in the allocation supported by a majority of committee members
the Project Investment is 170 and your individual allocation is 20. How much of your payoﬀ
would come from the Project Investment? a) 171.03; b) 189.74; c) 206.76; d) 195.58
2. How much of your payoﬀ would come from the individual allocation? a) 30; b) 100; c) 20; d)
170
3. What size is the Project Investment at the beginning of round 2? a) 144; b) 128; c) 136; d)
120
4. How much of your payoﬀ in round 2 would come from the Project Investment in round 1? a)
30; b) 58.31; c) 129.15; d) 60
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Appendix C: Further Analysis at the Aggregate Level
Number of Stages
The data shows a high proportion of accepted ﬁrst-stage proposals, similar to levels previously
reported in the literature (see for example Fréchette et al. 2003). If we consider the last ﬁve
matches in all treatments aggregating both periods the percentage of accepted proposals is above
80% and the median number of stages required is one. Figure 4 shows for each period and treatment
the average number of stages needed for a proposal to pass as the session evolves.
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Figure 4: Average Number of Stages
Minimum Winning Coalitions
Table 10 summarizes information with respect to MWCs in our dataset. Several patterns, common
to all treatments, emerge from the table. First, the proportion of MWCs is statistically higher in
the second period than in the ﬁrst period.42
Second, as subjects gain experience with the environment, they use MWCs more often. With
the exception of the DBhigh treatment (for period 1 proposals), in all cases the number of proposals
involving MWC is statistically higher when we focus on the last ﬁve matches.43 Third, almost all
subjects proposing a MWC in the ﬁrst period behave likewise in the second. The corresponding
42We run a panel random eﬀects regression with a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the proposal involves
a MWC on the left-hand side and a period dummy (1 for the second period) on the right-hand side. We cluster
standard errors by session. The p-values on the period dummy are: 0.000, 0.000 and 0.030 for the SB, DBlow, and
DBhigh treatments respectively.
43We run a panel random eﬀects regression with a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the proposal involves a
MWC on the left-hand side and a match dummy (1 for the matches 6-10) on the right-hand side. We cluster standard
errors by session. Focusing on period 1 proposals, the p-values on the match dummy are: 0.000, 0.083 and 0.273 for
the SB, DBlow, and DBhigh treatments respectively. The corresponding p-values for period 2 proposals are: 0.000,
0.002, and 0.000.
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Table 10: Proposals involving Minimum Winning Coalitions (in %)
Treatment All Matches Last Five
Period 1 55.6 66.2
SB Period 2 67.8 84.4
Both 51.3 63.6
Period 1 27.1 32.4
DBlow Period 2 52.1 64.3
Both 26.2 33.3
Period 1 33.5 37.4
DBhigh Period 2 65.6 78.2
Both 31.7 36.3
proportion reported in the third row of each treatment captures how many subjects proposed MWCs
in both periods and this ﬁgure closely follows the one reported for the ﬁrst period.
There are also diﬀerences across treatments. First, when there is full depreciation (SB treatment)
period 1 rates are on average higher than compared to other treatments. In the DB treatments only
about a third of proposals involve MWCs in the ﬁrst period, the lowest ﬁgures of the table. This
diﬀerence almost disappears when we compare second period rates. Second, although in some cases
the diﬀerences are small, rates are slightly higher in the DBhigh treatment when compared to the
DBlow treatment.44
Period 1 investment
Figure 5 displays the histograms for Period 1 investment across treatments and for diﬀerent subsets
of proposals: all, proposals that passed and proposals involving MWCs. Investment is heavily
concentrated around the bargaining equilibrium prediction in the SB case, but is relatively more
spread out in DB treatments. In almost every DB case we observe two modes for investment,
one relatively close to the bargaining equilibrium and a second closer to the planner's solution.
The exception is the DBhigh case for proposals involving MWCs, where most investment levels are
relatively closer to the bargaining equilibrium.
44We run a panel random eﬀects regression with a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the period 1 proposal involves
a MWC on the left-hand side and a treatment dummy (three pairwise comparisons in three separate regressions) on
the right-hand side. We cluster standard errors by session. When the treatment dummy takes value 0 for the SB
treatment, the coeﬃcients and p-values for the treatment dummy are: -0.339 and 0.016 (when comparing to DBlow),
and -0.281 and 0.061 (when comparing to DBhigh). When the treatment dummy involves DBlow (0) and DBhigh (1),
the coeﬃcient is positive (0.057), but not signiﬁcant (p-value 0.589).
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Figure 5: Distribution of Period 1 Investment as % of Budget
Solid lines: Bargaining equilibrium; Dashed lines: Planner's solution
Vertical axis measures the % of proposals in the corresponding bin
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Tables with support for statistical tests
Table 11: Diﬀerence between period 1 and period 2 investment decisions (last 5 matches)
SB DBlow DBhigh
QR RE QR RE QR RE
Estimate 0.000 3.813** 10.000*** 24.288*** 35.000*** 41.130***
Std. Err. 0.209 1.565 3.575 4.724 7.651 7.216
p-value 1.000 0.015 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: QR: Quantile regression (estimate of the conditional median), RE: Random Eﬀects Panel Estimation (estimate of the
conditional mean). Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: I1 − I2, Control: Constant
Table 12: Diﬀerence between period 1 and period 2 investment decisions (all 10 matches)
SB DBlow DBhigh
QR RE QR RE QR RE
Estimate 0.000 2.501*** 7.500*** 21.779*** 30.000*** 36.019***
Std. Err. 0.000 0.737 2.693 5.084 9.523 5.950
p-value . 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.000
Notes: QR: Quantile regression (estimate of the conditional median), RE: Random Eﬀects Panel Estimation (estimate of the
conditional mean). Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: I1 − I2, Control: Constant
Table 13: Quantile regression output for investment decisions (period 1 and period 2)
SB DBlow DBhigh
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Estimate 10.000*** 10.000*** 32.500*** 5.000 55.000*** 0.000
Std. Err. 1.876 0.997 8.102 4.819 7.659 1.012
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.301 0.000 1.000
p-value(Planner's) 0.000 0.000 0.157 0.003 0.000 1.000
p-value (Leg. Barg.) 0.184 0.013 0.052 0.385 0.188 1.000
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant
p-value(Planner's): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the planner's solution
p-value(Leg. Barg.): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the legislative
bargaining solution
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Table 14: Quantile regression output for period 1 investment decisions (all proposals and proposals
that involve MWCs)
SB DBlow DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Estimate 10.000*** 10.000*** 32.500*** 10.000 55.000*** 25.000***
Std. Err. 1.876 0.713 8.102 6.638 7.659 4.865
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.000
p-value(Planner's) 0.000 0.000 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value (Leg. Barg.) 0.184 0.001 0.052 0.317 0.188 0.000
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant
p-value(Planner's): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the planner's solution
p-value(Leg. Barg.): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the legislative
bargaining solution
Table 15: Random eﬀects regression output for period 1 investment decisions (all proposals and
proposals that involve MWCs)
SB DBlow DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Estimate 16.713*** 11.337*** 38.712*** 18.989*** 55.200*** 30.566***
Std. Err. 2.867 2.177 6.988 3.803 4.654 3.601
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value(Planner's) 0.000 0.000 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value (Leg. Barg.) 0.142 0.593 0.002 0.547 0.027 0.001
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant
p-value(Planner's): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the planner's solution
p-value(Leg. Barg.): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the legislative
bargaining solution
Table 16: Quantile regression output for period 1 investment decisions: Pairwise comparisons across
treatments (all proposals and proposals that involve MWCs, last 5 matches)
SB and DBlow SB and DBhigh DBlow and DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Constant 10.000*** 10.000*** 10.000*** 10.000*** 32.500*** 10.000
Std.Err. 3.464 1.234 3.363 2.116 9.841 7.531
p-value 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.186
T 22.500*** 0.000 45.000*** 15.000** 22.500* 15.000*
Std.Err 7.630 3.776 6.687 6.932 11.712 8.717
p-value 0.003 1.000 0.000 0.031 0.004 0.000
p-value(DIH) 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.087
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is from
DBlow (SB), DBhigh (SB), and DBhigh (DBlow) for each corresponding case.
p-value(DIH): Indicates the p-value of the hypothesis test for the Dynamic Ineﬃciency Hypothesis. For the comparison
between SB and DBlow, the null hypothesis is that the estimate for T is equal to 16. In the case of SB and DBhigh, the null
hypothesis is that the estimate for T is equal to 72. For the comparison between DBlow and DBhigh, the null hypothesis is
that the estimate for T is equal to 56.
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Table 17: Random eﬀects regression output for period 1 investment decisions: Pairwise comparisons
across treatments (all proposals and proposals that involve MWCs, last 5 matches)
SB and DBlow SB and DBhigh DBlow and DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Constant 16.713*** 11.364*** 16.713*** 11.340*** 38.712*** 18.946***
Std. Err 2.567 2.027 2.531 1.933 6.169 3.506
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
T 21.999*** 7.610* 38.487*** 19.232*** 16.488** 11.652**
Std. Err 6.764 4.012 5.040 3.889 7.553 4.867
p-value 0.001 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value(DIH) 0.375 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.017
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is from
DBlow (SB), DBhigh (SB), and DBhigh (DBlow) for each corresponding case.
p-value(DIH): Indicates the p-value of the hypothesis test for the Dynamic Ineﬃciency Hypothesis. For the comparison
between SB and DBlow, the null hypothesis is that the estimate for T is equal to 16. In the case of SB and DBhigh, the null
hypothesis is that the estimate for T is equal to 72. For the comparison between DBlow and DBhigh, the null hypothesis is
that the estimate for T is equal to 56.
Table 18: Quantile regression output for period 1 investment decisions: Pairwise comparisons across
treatments (all proposals and proposals that involve MWCs, all 10 matches)
SB and DBlow SB and DBhigh DBlow and DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Constant 15.000*** 10.000*** 15.000*** 10.000*** 32.500*** 10.000
Std.Err. 3.088 1.635 3.757 1.542 9.297 7.977
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.211
T 17.500* 0.000 40.000*** 20.000*** 22.500** 20.000**
Std.Err. 9.557 9.776 3.992 4.803 9.642 9.660
p-value 0.067 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.039
p-value(DIH) 0.876 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is from
DBlow (SB),DBhigh (SB), and DBhigh (DBlow) for each corresponding case.
p-value(DIH): Indicates the p-value of the hypothesis test for the Dynamic Ineﬃciency Hypothesis. For the comparison
between SB and DBlow, the null hypothesis is that the estimate for T is equal to 16. In the case of SB and DBhigh, the null
hypothesis is that the estimate for T is equal to 72. For the comparison between DBlow and DBhigh, the null hypothesis is
that the estimate for T is equal to 56.
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Table 19: Random eﬀects regression output for period 1 investment decisions: Pairwise comparisons
across treatments (all proposals and proposals that involve MWCs, all 10 matches)
SB and DBlow SB and DBhigh DBlow and DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Constant 19.883*** 14.085*** 19.883*** 13.949*** 41.846*** 19.798***
Std.Err. 3.010 2.265 2.967 2.270 7.022 2.798
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
T 21.963*** 5.796* 39.179*** 20.333*** 17.216** 14.474***
Std.Err. 7.732 3.295 3.966 3.172 7.499 3.567
p-value 0.005 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000
p-value(DIH) 0.440 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is from
DBlow (SB), DBhigh (SB), and DBhigh (DBlow) for each corresponding case.
p-value(DIH): Indicates the p-value of the hypothesis test for the Dynamic Ineﬃciency Hypothesis. For the comparison
between SB and DBlow, the null hypothesis is that the estimate for T is equal to 16. In the case of SB and DBhigh, the null
hypothesis is that the estimate for T is equal to 72. For the comparison between DBlow and DBhigh, the null hypothesis is
that the estimate for T is equal to 56.
Table 20: Quantile regression output for period 1 investment ineﬃciencies: Pairwise comparisons
across treatments (all proposals and proposals that involve MWCs, last 5 matches)
SB and DBlow SB and DBhigh DBlow and DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Constant 24.500* 2.000 4.500 -10.500*** -55.500* -48.000***
Std.Err. 13.249 2.681 8.822 3.782 30.445 13.596
p-value 0.065 0.457 0.610 0.006 0.069 0.001
T -6.500 16.000*** 13.500*** 28.500*** 33.500*** 41.000***
Std.Err. 8.681 2.056 3.856 2.915 11.034 5.308
p-value 0.454 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is from
DBlow (SB), DBhigh (SB), and DBhigh (DBlow) for each corresponding case.
Table 21: Random eﬀects regression output for period 1 investment ineﬃciencies: Pairwise compar-
isons across treatments (all proposals and proposals that involve MWCs, last 5 matches)
SB and DBlow SB and DBhigh DBlow and DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Constant 17.285** 8.246 -5.470 -9.724*** -73.736*** -63.641***
Std.Err. 8.094 5.332 4.377 3.355 20.458 12.497
p-value 0.033 0.122 0.211 0.004 0.000 0.000
T -5.999 8.390** 16.757*** 26.384*** 39.512*** 44.348***
Std.Err. 6.764 4.012 2.520 1.945 7.553 4.867
p-value 0.375 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is from
DBlow (SB), DBhigh (SB), and DBhigh (DBlow) for each corresponding case.
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Table 22: Quantile regression output for welfare (all proposals and proposals that involve MWCs)
SB DBlow DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Estimate 94.164*** 94.164*** 107.968*** 103.500*** 180.000*** 169.594***
Std. Err. 3.194 3.204 4.104 11.219 6.594 8.918
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value(Planner's) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.001 0.000
p-value (Leg. Barg.) 0.069 0.070 0.638 0.570 0.928 0.274
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: W , Control: Constant
p-value(Planner's): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the planner's solution
p-value(Leg. Barg.): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the legislative
bargaining solution
Table 23: Random eﬀects regression output for welfare (all proposals and proposals that involve
MWCs)
SB DBlow DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Estimate 91.507*** 91.575*** 97.557*** 84.679*** 169.381*** 166.999***
Std. Err. 0.685 0.977 4.890 2.603 5.591 4.663
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value(Planner's) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value (Leg. Barg.) 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.073 0.008
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: W , Control: Constant
p-value(Planner's): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the planner's solution
p-value(Leg. Barg.): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the legislative
bargaining solution
Table 24: Quantile regression output for welfare ineﬃciencies: Pairwise comparisons across treat-
ments (all proposals and proposals that involve MWCs, last 5 matches)
SB and DBlow SB and DBhigh DBlow and DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Constant 18.336*** 18.336*** 18.336*** 18.336*** 18.632*** 23.100***
Std.Err. 2.028 1.501 2.504 1.696 3.859 8.618
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008
T 0.296 4.764 3.564 13.970 3.268 9.206
Std.Err. 4.402 9.691 6.259 11.536 7.377 12.604
p-value 0.946 0.624 0.569 0.227 0.658 0.466
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: ∆WT , Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is from
DBlow (SB), DBhigh (SB), and DBhigh (DBlow) for each corresponding case.
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Table 25: Random eﬀects regression output for welfare ineﬃciencies: Pairwise comparisons across
treatments (all proposals and proposals that involve MWCs, last 5 matches)
SB and DBlow SB and DBhigh DBlow and DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Constant 20.993*** 21.195*** 20.993*** 20.461*** 29.043*** 40.211***
Std.Err. 0.613 1.078 0.605 0.676 4.317 1.918
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
T 8.050* 20.595*** 11.527** 14.282*** 3.476 -6.121
Std.Err. 4.421 2.529 5.270 4.479 6.786 5.077
p-value 0.069 0.000 0.029 0.001 0.608 0.228
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: ∆WT , Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is from
DBlow (SB), DBhigh (SB), and DBhigh (DBlow) for each corresponding case.
Table 26: Quantile regression output for welfare ineﬃciencies: Pairwise comparisons across treat-
ments (all proposals and proposals that involve MWCs, all 10 matches)
SB and DBlow SB and DBhigh DBlow and DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Constant 8.241 17.027** 2.814 6.610 -13.467 -24.641
Std.Err. 6.735 8.653 6.678 4.414 24.948 25.913
p-value 0.221 0.050 0.674 0.135 0.589 0.343
T 5.019 1.309 10.446* 11.726*** 15.873 22.143**
Std.Err. 4.501 7.598 5.917 3.001 11.878 9.776
p-value 0.265 0.863 0.078 0.000 0.182 0.024
Notes: Excludes 32 out of 420 observations in treatment DBlow where W = 0. Standard Errors clustered by session.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: ∆WT , Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is from
DBlow (SB), DBhigh (SB), and DBhigh (DBlow) for each corresponding case.
Table 27: Random eﬀects regression output for welfare ineﬃciencies (all proposals and proposals
that involve MWCs, all 10 matches)
SB and DBlow SB and DBhigh DBlow and DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Constant 11.413*** 13.081* 7.378*** 10.007*** -4.699 6.328
Std.Err. 4.405 7.421 2.716 2.645 16.226 21.291
p-value 0.010 0.078 0.007 0.000 0.772 0.766
T 6.191 6.612 10.226*** 9.261*** 14.252** 10.696
Std.Err. 4.283 6.979 2.587 1.806 6.628 7.494
p-value 0.148 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.154
Notes: Excludes 32 out of 420 observations in treatment DBlow where W = 0. Standard Errors clustered by session.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: W , Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is from DBlow
(SB), DBhigh (SB), and DBhigh (DBlow) for each corresponding case.
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Table 28: Random eﬀects regression output for welfare: Pairwise comparisons across treatments
(all proposals and proposals that involve MWCs, last 5 matches)
SB and DBlow SB and DBhigh DBlow and DBhigh
All MWC All MWC All MWC
Constant 91.507*** 91.305*** 91.507*** 92.039*** 97.557*** 86.389***
Std.Err. 0.613 1.078 0.605 0.676 4.317 1.918
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
T 6.050 -6.495** 77.873*** 75.118*** 71.824*** 81.421***
Std.Err. 4.421 2.529 5.270 4.479 6.786 5.077
p-value 0.171 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value(DIH) 0.069 0.000 0.029 0.001 0.608 0.228
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: W , Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is from DBlow
(SB), DBhigh (SB), and DBhigh (DBlow) for each corresponding case.
p-value(DIH): Indicates the p-value of the hypothesis test for the Dynamic Ineﬃciency Hypothesis. For the comparison
between SB and DBlow, the null hypothesis is that the estimate for T is equal to 14.1. In the case of SB and DBhigh, the null
hypothesis is that the estimate for T is equal to 89.4. For the comparison between DBlow and DBhigh, the null hypothesis is
that the estimate for T is equal to 75.3.
Appendix D: Further Analysis at the Individual Level
Distribution of Investment in Period 1
Figure 6 displays the distribution of period 1 investment by treatment and by strategy type for the
last 5 matches of each session.
Distribution of Private Allocations
Private allocations capture how the budget remaining after public investment is divided among
committee members and Table 29 summarizes the relevant information. For each treatment there
are two statistics: the allocation to the proposer (xPr) and the allocation to a non-proposer in
the coalition (xNPr).45 The `theory' values presented in the table correspond to the bargaining
equilibrium for Type MM proposals and to the identiﬁed theoretical candidate within each type in
other cases.
Proposals involving MWCs should reﬂect proposer power: allocations should theoretically double
that of the Non-Proposer coalition member. To test for the presence of proposal power we construct
the ratio between the allocation to the proposer and the non proposer in the coalition (xPr/xNPr).
We then use a random eﬀects model and regress that ratio on a constant (see footnote 18 for more
details). Under the null hypothesis of no proposal power, the coeﬃcient estimated on the constant
is not diﬀerent than one. We can reject the null only in the case of Type MM proposals in the SB
treatment. In that case, there is a small presence of proposal power at levels comparable to previous
reports in the literature (see for example Fréchette et al. (2003)). There is no evidence of proposal
45In proposals satisfying deﬁnition A, xNPr is computed for each proposal as the average to both coalition members
other than the proposer.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Period 1 Investment as % of Budget
Lines: Theory predictions
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Table 29: Private allocations as % of Budget
Type MM Type EM Type EE
Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
Theory Med. Theory Med Theory Med Theory Med Theory Med Theory Med
SB
xPr 58.4 45.0 58.4 45.0 24.0 25.0 58.4 45.0 24.0 25.0 24.0 25.0
xNPr 29.1 42.5 29.1 42.5 24.0 25.0 29.1 45.0 24.0 25.0 24.0 25.0
DBlow
xPr 55.6 45.0 60.1 50.0 18.7 16.5 60.1 50.0 18.7 20.0 26.9 25.0
xNPr 27.8 45.0 30.3 49.0 18.7 15.0 30.3 50.0 18.7 20.0 26.9 25.0
DBhigh
xPr 36.8 35.0 66.7 49.5 0 5.0 66.7 50.0 0 10.0 33.3 23.5
xNPr 18.4 35.0 33.3 45.0 0 5.0 33.3 50.0 0 10.0 33.3 23.5
Theory: Predicted values; Med: Observed median
xPr : Allocation to proposer
xNPr : Allocation to non-proposer who is a coalition member
Table 30: Transitions from type in match 6 to latter matches
Treatment Type in Match 6
Prob. selects each strategy type in matches 7-10 (in %)
Type MM Type EM Type EE Other
SB
Type MM 82.5 13.3 0.0 4.2
Type EM 20.8 42.5 8.3 12.5
Type EE 8.3 29.2 25.0 37.5
Other 41.7 0.0 0.0 58.3
DBlow
Type MM 71.2 9.6 9.6 9.6
Type EM 36.1 61.1 0.0 2.8
Type EE 2.9 27.9 64.7 4.4
Other 16.7 58.3 25.0 0.0
DBhigh
Type MM 77.6 10.5 6.6 5.3
Type EM 13.8 78.8 7.5 0.0
Type EE 4.2 37.5 52.1 6.3
Other 50.0 8.3 0.0 41.7
power in DB treatments.
Strategy Types as the session evolves
For each subject we ﬁx the strategy type they select in match 6 and we compute the likelihood they
select each possible type in matches 7-10. We report the probabilities in Table 30.
A few patterns emerge. First, there is a high persistence of the most popular strategy types.
Type MM strategies are the most popular in the SB treatment and a large majority of subjects
selecting those strategies in match 6 (82.5%), stick to that type for the remainder of the session.
Similar conclusions apply, for example, for Type MM and Type EM strategies in the DBhigh treat-
ment. Second, for those who select Type EM in match 6, but change afterwards the most popular
transition is towards Type MM strategies. Third, for those who select Type EE in match 6, the
most popular switch is to Type EM proposals.
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Table 31: Proportion of subjects who use one, two, or all strategy types
Treatment
SB DBlow DBhigh
Only Type MM 15.6% 4.8% 9.3%
Only Type EM 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Only Type EE 0.0% 9.5% 3.7%
Only Type MM or Type EM 31.1% 26.2% 29.6%
Only Type MM or Type EE 15.6% 9.5% 3.7%
Only Type EM or Type EE 15.5% 28.6% 29.6%
All Types× 22.2% 21.4% 24.1%
Notes: × All types involve subjects who used Type MM, Type EE and Type EM at some point in the experiment. It is possible
that some of these subjects also used strategies classiﬁed as "Other."
An alternative point of view to study how subjects transition among strategies is to consider the
proportion of subjects who use only one strategy type or more during a session. Table 31 shows for
each treatment the proportion of subjects who use only one type, two types or all types. Slightly
more than 20% of subjects across treatments use all three strategy types. Most subjects use two
strategy types with the groups: `Type MM and Type EM' and `Type EM and Type EE' being the
most popular.
Strategies of type MM and EM: Payoﬀ Comparison
Given that strategies type MM and type EM remain popular in both DB treatments towards the
end of the session, we inspect further diﬀerences in payoﬀs between them. To do this we take the
place of a period 1 proposer and consider her alternatives. That is, we focus on subjects who were
proposers in period 1 and compare earnings depending on the value of A1 (see section 5.4 for a
deﬁnition).
For type EM proposals to be attractive, there should be a period 2 reward. Thus, we look at
period 2 payoﬀs of period 1 proposers, u2 = x
P1
2 +f(g2), and estimate u2 = α0+α1A1+. A positive
estimate for α1 would suggest that using a strategy type EM in period 1 increases payoﬀs in period
2. The last column of Table 32 presents the estimates for α1, which are signiﬁcant at the 5% level
for all treatments. Quantitatively, additional payoﬀs imply an extra 15% in the second period. The
extra gain in period 2 comes at the cost of a lower period 1 payoﬀ: in comparison to the bargaining
solution, a proposal closer to the planner's implies higher payoﬀs for the committee as a whole, but
lower payoﬀs for the proposer. Table 32 shows mean period 1 payoﬀs to the proposer, depending
on proposal type. There are negligible diﬀerences between type EM and EE proposals, but such
proposals lag compared to type MM: on average they represent between 72 and 76% of type MM
payoﬀs depending on treatment. Yet, if we add the additional period 2 payoﬀ the diﬀerences shrink:
a proposal of type EM involves between 86 and 89% of the payoﬀs to a type MM proposal.
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Table 32: Period 1 Payoﬀ Levels: Accepted Proposals
Treatment
Mean Period 1 Payoﬀs to proposers Additional Period 2
Type MM Type EM Type EE Payoﬀ if A1=1
SB 112.6 85.5 85.4 13.6
DBlow 107.4 80.1 81.7 15.2
DBhigh 105.5 76.0 78.2 14.5
Table 33: Type EM strategies: Punishment and Rewards Random Eﬀects Estimates
SB DBlow DBhigh
Variable Coeﬀ. Rob. Sd. Err. Coeﬀ. Rob. Sd. Err. Coeﬀ. Rob. Sd. Err.
Constant 20.50*** (1.26) 19.52*** (2.35) 22.29** (1.25)
A1 2.60*** (0.98) 1.79 (2.89) -2.59 (1.31)
EMstrategy -6.36 (4.56) -9.07*** (2.63) -2.74*** (3.08)
A1× EMstrategy 4.92 (13.29) 15.54** (7.97) 12.09*** (4.07)
Number of Observations 300 280 360
Notes: *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Type EM strategies: Punishments and Rewards estimates
Table 33 provides the estimates used for our computations in Table 9.
Determinants of Voting
Now we study the features that determine whether a proposal passes or not. This exercise can also
help to understand why some strategy types are selected. If, for example, a proposal type EM or
type EE was more likely to be voted up in period 1, then it may be more likely to be selected vis a
vis a proposal involving a MWC. We focus on stage 1, period 1 proposals that were submitted for
voting and estimate
voteim = 1
{
β0 + β1 (f(I1)im) + β2x1,im + β3x
Pr
1,im + β4Eim + β5MWCim + αi + νim ≥ 0
}
,
where voteim is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if subject i approved the proposal in match m,
and 1{·} is an indicator function that takes value one if the left-hand side of the inequality inside the
braces is greater than or equal to zero and the value zero otherwise. Explanatory variables include
the investment payoﬀ (f(I1)), the private period 1 allocation (x1), the allocation to the proposer
(xPr1 ) and dummy variables for whether the proposal involves an Equal Split (E) or a MWC. The
equation is estimated using a random eﬀects probit, with a one-way subject error component for all
rounds. Table 34 reports the corresponding marginal eﬀects.
The coeﬃcients provide evidence that there is a positive eﬀect of investment payoﬀ and private
allocations on the probability of voting positively for a proposal and a negative eﬀect from higher
private allocations to the proposer. This is consistent with previous estimates in the literature (see
Fréchette et al. (2003, 2005)). Estimates on the Equal split and MWC dummies are positive, but
not signiﬁcant in the DB treatments. This suggests that there is not a particular gain in terms of
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Table 34: Period 1 Voting: Random Eﬀects Probit (Marginal Eﬀects)
SB DBlow DBhigh
Variable Coeﬃcient Rob. Std. Err. Coeﬃcient Rob. Std. Err. Coeﬃcient Rob. Std. Err.
Investment Payoﬀ 0.023* (0.013) 0.032*** (0.010) 0.039*** (0.011)
Private Allocation 0.057*** (0.067) 0.050*** (0.007) 0.048*** (0.006)
Proposer Private Allocation -0.023*** (0.007) -0.023*** (0.006) -0.025*** (0.005)
MWC 0.608* (0.335) 0.230 (0.372) 0.045 (0.254)
Equal Split 0.118 (0.210) 0.254 (0.268) 0.226 (0.228)
Number of Observations 450 420 540
Notes: *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Only the ﬁrst stage of proposals for each round is considered.
Investment Payoﬀ=5(investment)0.5
higher likelihood of a proposal passing because it involves an Equal Split or a MWC.
Tables with support for statistical tests
Table 35: Quantile regression output for period 1 investment decisions
Type MM Type EM Type EE
SB DBlow DBhigh SB DBlow DBhigh SB DBlow DBhigh
Estimate 10.000*** 50.000*** 30.000*** 25.000*** 50.000*** 85.000*** 25.000*** 50.000*** 70.000***
Std. Err. 1.023 11.869 5.226 0.388 11.869 15.850 0.187 11.869 4.767
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value (Theory) 0.015 0.006 0.005 0.614 0.000 0.345 0.000 0.614 0.563
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant
p-value(Theory): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the theoretical value in
Table tab:InvStrategies
Table 36: Random eﬀects regression output for period 1 investment decisions
Type MM Type EM Type EE
SB DBlow DBhigh SB DBlow DBhigh SB DBlow DBhigh
Estimate 13.623*** 19.792*** 33.208*** 27.848*** 51.542*** 73.453*** 30.202*** 50.666*** 66.886***
Std. Err. 3.156 1.953 3.174 1.127 7.422 1.996 3.238 8.971 4.216
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value (Theory) 0.722 0.113 0.000 0.893 0.309 0.000 0.496 0.458 0.000
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant
p-value(Theory): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the theoretical value in
Table tab:InvStrategies
61
Table 37: Quantile regression output for period 2 investment decisions
Type MM Type EM Type EE
SB DBlow DBhigh SB DBlow DBhigh SB DBlow DBhigh
Estimate 10.000*** 0.000 5.000 10.000*** 0.000 0.000 25.000*** 25.000*** 31.000*
Std. Err. 1.245 1.181 6.289 3.592 0.600 0.000 0.795 3.277 16.957
p-value 0.000 1.000 0.428 0.007 1.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.070
p-value (Theory) 0.046 0.000 0.423 0.489 0.000 - 0.000 0.084 0.000
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session whenever possible. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at
1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant
p-value(Theory): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the theoretical value in
Table tab:InvStrategies
Table 38: Random eﬀects regression output for period 2 investment decisions
Type MM Type EM Type EE
SB DBlow DBhigh SB DBlow DBhigh SB DBlow DBhigh
Estimate 12.289*** 7.542*** 12.986*** 12.702*** 7.914*** 10.962*** 30.225*** 33.869*** 41.323***
Std. Err. 2.166 2.899 0.736 4.058 1.470 2.601 2.480 3.156 11.404
p-value 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value (Theory) 0.923 0.567 0.000 0.960 0.382 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session whenever possible. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at
1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant
p-value(Theory): indicates the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that the estimate equals the theoretical value in
Table tab:InvStrategies
Table 39: Random eﬀects regression output for investment comparisons across types
Type MM v Type EM Type MM v Type EE Type EM v Type EE
SB DBlow DBhigh SB DBlow DBhigh SB DBlow DBhigh
Constant 14.921*** 16.985*** 31.887*** 13.833*** 20.077*** 32.997*** 28.321*** 50.481*** 74.520***
3.111 6.066 3.033 2.560 1.769 4.198 1.240 6.941 1.905
0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
T 9.037* 36.081*** 40.903*** 18.083*** 29.946*** 36.407*** 1.996 2.306 -2.891
4.661 3.297 4.491 4.066 9.066 4.702 1.753 2.987 2.142
0.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.255 0.440 0.177
Notes: Standard Errors clustered by session. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%;
Dependent variable: Investment, Control: Constant and treatment dummy T , that takes value 1 (0) if the observation is Type
EM (Type MM), Type EE (Type MM), and Type EE (Type EM) for each corresponding case.
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